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Abstract 
Globalization is one of the most significant developments in the world today. At the same 
time that globalization is integrating the world, violent conflicts are to an increasing degree 
internal affairs, rather than international. Most of the previous research on the subject is 
concerned with economic globalization and civil war, but there is more to both globalization 
and internal conflict. I attempt to shed light on the relationship between the two using a broad, 
three-part definition of globalization and data on different forms of violent internal conflict. 
Through a statistical analysis I find that a high level of social globalization is related to higher 
levels of internal peace, and that certain features of economic globalization is related to lower 
risk of riots, but dangerous when implemented in sudden shocks. Political globalization, on 
the other hand, does not appear to matter much to the risk of internal conflict. Regardless of 
the effect of a higher level, I expected the process of globalization to be dangerous. Slow 
change is not particularly influential, but there is some indication that rapid increases in level 
of economic globalization are connected with a greater risk of both riots and guerrilla war. 
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1 Introduction 
Globalization is a popular topic for debate in the world today, and has been for the last few 
decades. No wonder, as it is a phenomenon that potentially affects the whole world: it is, of 
course, geographically widespread, and it is widespread in the sense that it takes place in 
practically all areas of society – in the economy, in our social and cultural lives (including 
science), and in politics and government. Despite being a popular topic for academic debate, 
there is little consensus about exactly how important globalization is to societal 
developments; it may be a wide phenomenon, but how deep is it? Some believe the world to 
be fully globalized; the other extreme denies that any globalization whatsoever has occurred 
(Scholte, 2005: 15). Some of the variation in views can be traced to the fact that there is no 
consensus on what globalization is. The bulk of the research on globalization treats it as a 
mainly economic development, as internationalization, liberalization, and integration of 
national economies. However, I argue that there is much more to it than that. Globalization is 
going on in the political world, as governments and political organizations cooperate more 
and more; in the cultural world, as entertainment media, norms, and belief systems span out 
across the globe; and in society in general, as people and information increasingly cross 
national borders. 
Warfare is going through changes, too. The ‘new wars’ (McGrew, 2007) or 
‘asymmetric wars’ of the contemporary world are not conflicts between two (roughly) equally 
powerful states, but often between a state and rebel groups who cannot match the state in 
organization and equipment and therefore use tactics like guerrilla warfare or terrorism (Levy, 
2007: 19). Scholars have examined the relationship between globalization and international 
conflict, but its relationship with internal conflict is less intuitive, an less studied. However, as 
the changing nature of warfare is happening in an increasingly globalized world, there is 
reason to ask whether there is a connection. It raises the question of whether globalization is 
contributing to internal conflict in general, and if it has anything to do with the changing face 
of conflict. Does it promote certain forms of violence, and reduce the likelihood of others? In 
other words, are different types of conflict affected differently by globalization? And if 
globalization does affect internal conflicts, is there a difference between the effects of 
globalization in one area of society, and globalization in another? The following study 
attempts to shed light on these questions. 
Because the term globalization covers developments in highly diverse fields, I divide 
it into three categories: economic, social, and political. This makes the results more 
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meaningful, gives a better understanding of what exactly is dangerous and what is pacifying, 
and allows the results to be more comparable to other studies that may only have been carried 
out on one of the categories. Studying the different parts of globalization separately is 
especially interesting when studying several forms of internal conflict. For example, political 
globalization might have no effect on the occurrence of riots, but still influence the risk of 
civil war. My general research question is, thus, as follows: 
 
Does globalization affect internal conflict, and does its effect vary by form of globalization 
and form of internal conflict? 
 
Chapter 2 is a presentation of the theoretical background for the study. I start the chapter by 
defining the key concepts of the thesis, globalization and internal conflict. Globalization is 
understood as consistent of three subcategories: economic, social, and political globalization. 
Internal conflict is divided into two: spontaneous and organized conflict forms. These are 
explained by different theories, and I argue that the mechanisms leading to the one conflict 
type is different from the mechanisms leading to the other. With the theoretical basis covered, 
I discuss how the two concepts are likely to relate to each other. Existing theories and 
previous research present a multitude of arguments both in favor of and against globalization, 
and I attempt to sum up the most important and most plausible of these. For each of the 
subcategory of globalization I derive a set of pro and con hypotheses from these discussions, 
because both sides have convincing arguments. I also discuss whether the process of change 
can be expected to have a different influence on conflict than a static level of globalization, 
and whether different conflicts can be expected to be affected by globalization in different 
ways. 
In chapter 3 I describe how the empirical analysis is designed and conducted. The 
study is carried out as a statistical analysis covering 142 countries over the period of 38 years 
from 1970 to 2007, using logit regression. The data on globalization is taken from the KOF 
Globalization Index (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008), while the internal conflict data is 
taken from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2011) and the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002).  
In chapter 4 I present the results of the analyses and discuss what they mean. I find 
that globalization does affect the risk of internal conflict, although not in all forms and in all 
operationalizations. The effect varies by type of globalization: social globalization is the most 
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influential form of globalization. According to the results, a high level of social globalization 
is related to a lower risk of violent internal conflict. I question and discuss whether this is 
because of the way it is measured or because of a real pacifying effect of global social 
integration. Economic globalization is only found to be statistically significant in the form of 
policies, not as measured by FDI, trade, and portfolio investments; operationalized as level it 
is connected with a lower risk; as shock, it is associated with higher. Globalization also seems 
to affect different conflicts differently, although these findings are not as robust. The results 
indicate that shocks of globalization only influence the risk of spontaneous conflict, not 
organized, although an analysis of guerrilla warfare shows a relationship between shocks of 
economic globalization and a heightened risk, in the same way that shocks of economically 
globalizing policies appears to increase the risk of riots. Political globalization, on the other 
hand, does not seem to be a particularly good explanatory factor for either riots or civil war.  
Chapter 5 is the conclusion, where I sum up the findings. I assess what implications 
the results of my analysis might have for later research and for policy making. I also discuss 
some weaknesses of this particular study, some of which might be improved in later studies. 
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2 Theory 
Does globalization influence the likelihood of internal conflict? In what ways could it lead to 
more conflict, in what ways could it lead to less, and does it promote certain types of conflict 
over others? Before taking on these questions there are two more basic things that need to be 
clarified, namely (1) what is globalization, and (2) what is internal conflict. I start this chapter 
by discussing different understandings of the word globalization, from the ones revolving 
around economic internationalization to more comprehensive concepts of development, which 
include social, cultural, and political factors as well. In this thesis I use a broad definition. It 
allows me to get a picture both of how global interaction as a whole affects internal conflict, 
as well as a more detailed view of how globalization of different areas of society may have 
different effects. One type of global interaction may be making countries more prone to civil 
conflict, while another is promoting peace. Following the definition of globalization I discuss 
how it can affect the world in terms of equality, democracy, and security. 
My focus is on globalization’s consequences for internal security, and the second 
section of the theory chapter is a definition of the term ‘internal conflict’ and theories 
explaining why they occur. I describe different forms of violent conflict and different theories 
on what causes them, and what allows them to persist and potentially grow from 
‘spontaneous’ violent clashes to ‘organized’ armed conflicts. 
Finally, I discuss the relationship between globalization and internal conflict. There is 
no consensus on whether it is a negative or positive influence, and I assess a number of 
theoretical arguments from each side of the debate and derive a set of pro and con hypotheses 
for the empirical analyses. I further argue that different forms of conflict are likely to be 
differently affected by globalization. 
 
2.1 What is Globalization? 
2.1.1 Overall Phenomenon 
Globalization is a word that is used by many different people in many different ways, and 
what I mean by it in this particular study must therefore be thoroughly described. It is a word 
that tends to be over-used and under-explained, resulting in confusing and less than fruitful 
debates. Divergent understandings of the term leads to divergent understandings of how 
prevalent the phenomenon is – according to Scholte (2005: 15), the field ranges from those 
that believe the world to be fully globalized, to those that ‘deny that any globalization 
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whatsoever has occurred’. In any case, the term is not particularly helpful in itself, as it could 
very well cover anything and everything, and using the word ‘global’ invites over-
generalizations (Tomlinson, 2007: 148). It is useful then, to devote a generous amount of 
space to describing what exactly I include and do not include in the term ‘globalization’. 
A simple way of categorizing the different understandings of the word is saying that it 
may be used in a broad or in a narrow sense. The narrower and most often used definition 
refers to the increasingly global nature of economy and markets; less trade barriers, lower 
tariff rates, increased capital flow across borders and so on. In the broad sense, it means more 
generally that the world is ‘shrinking’ – not only economically, but also culturally, socially, 
and politically. In a broad definition globalization can be seen as ‘the fact that different 
cultures and economic systems around the world are becoming connected and similar to each 
other because of the influence of large multinational companies and of improved 
communication’ (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2005: 659).  
So what do scholars mean by globalization? The term may be diffuse in public debate, 
but surely researchers must have a more fixed idea of what it means. Scholte (2005: 16-17) 
identifies five different definitions of globalization that are prevalent in the academic 
literature. The first two are of an economic nature. Internationalization, in short, understands 
it as the actual flows of capital, goods, labor, people, and ideas between nations. 
Liberalization, on the other hand, is more about policies; globalization is the process of 
removing trade barriers and other state-imposed restrictions on the economy, and on the 
movement of people (i.e. visas). Third is the universialization perspective, which perceives 
globalization as the emergence of an increasingly global culture – exemplified by spread of 
automobile use, Chinese restaurants, IKEAs, ways of food production etcetera. Yet others see 
globalization as westernization/modernization/Americanization. From this perspective it is a 
form of imperialism, whether economical, social, cultural, or political, as the many ‘-isms’ of 
the western countries spread across the world – capitalism, individualism, rationalism, and 
bureaucratism. In this perspective, democratization (meaning implementation of the 
institutions of electoral democracy developed in western countries) can be seen as part of 
political globalization. Galtung (1971) describes in detail how such imperialism manifests 
itself in communication, economic, cultural, military, and political ways, and defines one of 
its mechanisms as ‘vertical interaction’ (ibid.: 91). Vertical interaction is characterized by 
exchanges (of e.g. goods) whereby ‘the dominating nation enriches itself more as a result of 
the interaction process than the dominated nation’ (ibid.: 116). If this is what globalization is, 
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there is reason to believe it may create a conflict-prone climate – especially in poor countries, 
and especially if at the same time new technology enables people in dominated peripheries to 
be more conscious of their situation. Lastly, Scholte describes respatialization (under which 
he categorizes himself). In this view, globalization is the deterritorialization of social relations 
and transactions, i.e., distance in the social world cannot be equated to territorial distance; 
another way of saying that the world is shrinking. Globalization is, then, the process by which 
‘people become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally, and psychologically 
– to engage with each other wherever on planet Earth they may be’ (Scholte, 2005: 59). 
Because the term globalization embodies such a wide range of societal developments, 
it is useful to divide it into three categories: economic, social, and political globalization. 
These categories are distinguishable both theoretically and empirically, and it is theoretically 
meaningful to assess these three areas of society separately as they can be expected to have 
different effects on people’s life; a change in the number of foreign embassies in your country 
affects you in other ways than seeing the latest Hollywood blockbuster at your local movie 
theater. Moreover, different areas of society can globalize at different rates and at different 
times; an increase in international trade does not automatically mean an equally high increase 
in international political involvement. 
 
2.1.2 Economic Globalization 
Economic globalization is the process of integration of economies across the world, through 
liberalization and internationalization (Scholte, 2005). Features of this process are the opening 
up of markets, and freer flow of capital, goods, and labor across national borders (Dreher, 
Gaston, and Martens, 2008). It’s consequences is among other things that companies may buy 
raw material for their products from one country, have them processed in another, and sell 
them in yet another, enabled by technological advances in communication and efficient global 
infrastructure. The investors that put money into the companies may be based in different 
continents, but computer technology and the globalization of financial systems makes it 
possible for capital to be moved efficiently around the world. This provides flexibility and 
freedom, but it also means that a global economy is very vulnerable, as changes happen fast, 
and downturns in one part of the globalized world have impact way beyond national borders. 
Economic globalization can be described as the ‘contemporary surge in economic 
interdependence’ (Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch, 2003: 3). This increasing 
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interdependence is a two-dimensional phenomenon consisting of (1) increasing flows of 
capital and goods across borders (internationalization), and (2) the removal of policy 
restrictions on such flows, e.g. lowering of tariff rates and less taxes on international trade 
(liberalization) (Dreher, 2006: 43; Scholte, 2005). Rodrik (1997b) notes that even the most 
globalized economies still retain a high level of independence – higher than we might be led 
to believe by the public debate. For instance, Toronto trades ten times as much with 
Vancouver as with Seattle, even though the geographical distance is more or less the same 
(Nye, 2009: 203). But even so, the desire to be ‘internationally competitive’ is in fact 
narrowing the bounds within which national policy makers can operate (Rodrik, 1997b: 23). 
Goods and finances flow far from freely across national borders, but the international 
competition brought on by economic globalization has a biasing effect on policymaking; it 
encourages governments to adopt liberalist economic policies that promote efficient 
production and thereby make the country’s products more attractive in the global market. The 
relation between the two dimensions mentioned above is thus that (2) is carried out to achieve 
(1). 
While some policies are created on the national level, another driving force of 
economic globalization on is external, in form of international agreements and policies that 
come from membership in supranational organizations or unions. These supranational actors 
may have different focus areas, and they may be regional, like the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and Mercosur1, or worldwide, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One example of a 
globalizing policy initiated by an international actor is the Euro. The introduction of a 
common currency in large parts of the European Union (EU) was an effort to make trade and 
international investment easier between the countries of the Eurozone. It was a ‘liberalizing’ 
policy choice made to increase ‘internationalization’, a reduction of the practical restrictions 
that different currencies have on trade.  
Other important forces of economic globalization are the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB). They have a great deal of influence when it comes to 
liberalizing national economies and in that way the promote the second dimension of 
economic globalization, and they operate with a neoliberal economic philosophy. In order to 
                                                
1 It must be noted that the interaction between members of the EEA and Mercosur might more 
appropriately be identified as regionalization than globalization, but in my definition here I see all 
international engagements as ‘global’, regardless of the geographical distance between the actors. 
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be granted loans from the IMF and the WB, countries are expected to undergo economic 
reform. The standard set of reform policies are, in a term coined by John Williamson in 1989, 
known as the Washington consensus (Peet, 2009: 15). These include tax reform, securing 
property rights, reducing public expenditure, trade liberalization, deregulating and privatizing 
the economy in order to enable competition, encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
competitive exchange rates – all of which are in accordance with economic globalization. The 
decision to adopt such policies is therefore not necessarily based entirely on free choice – 
especially for developing nations; it may be influenced by the diffusion of neoliberal ideas, 
but also by the need for IMF or WB funding or explicit pressure from the US government 
(mainly in Latin American countries) (Mosley, 2007: 106). 
When inter- or supranational economic agreements and organizations are getting more 
numerous, it affects the power of national governments. Add non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) to the mix, and national sovereignty is 
considerably diminished (Moses and Brigham, 2007). Some talk about ‘marketization’; 
liberal theory contends that the invisible hand of the market is all the regulation one needs, 
and thus that state regulations should be minimized. The global market is gaining power, 
through international agreements or the race to be international competitive, at the expense of 
national sovereignty (Barber, 1992). However, the suppliers of the markets are not the only 
ones gaining power; consumers are empowered, too (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 148-149). 
Less government regulation, lower tariff rates, and online retailers give consumers a great 
deal of independence. 
 
2.1.3 Social Globalization 
The economy is not the only area of society that is globalizing. Social globalization is the 
increasing global flow of information, ideas, cultures, and people, enabled by improved 
geographical mobility and more or less revolutionizing innovations in communication 
technology. Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008:44) group elements of social globalization 
into three categories: cultural proximity, personal contacts, and information flows.2 
Increasing cultural proximity is evident in how different people all over the world are 
eating in the same restaurant chains, watching the same television shows, and wearing the 
                                                
2 The term ‘cultural globalization’ is sometimes used instead of ‘social globalization’. I prefer to use 
the word ‘social’ as I think it better represents all three elements mentioned above, while ‘cultural’ 
draws the focus more toward the cultural proximity element in particular. 
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same clothes. McDonalds’ and Chinese restaurants are spread out across the globe, and 
American pop music and Bollywood films are entertaining people well beyond the borders of 
the USA and India. ‘Proximity’ indicates that cultures are ‘moving’ from separate places 
closer together. Social globalization can thus be described as the distance between the 
traditional perception of national identity – e.g. what is fundamentally and typically 
‘Norwegian’, and the actual everyday reality – where kebabs, Coca Cola, and American 
television shows are more common elements than lutefisk and lefse (Moses and Brigham, 
2007: 17). As the global spread of culture is inserting common elements into vastly different 
parts of the world, it is providing people with a common cultural reference base. It is 
becoming easier to relate to people regardless of nationality, and as especially English is 
getting more and more widespread, linguistic barriers are eroding, too. This diffusion of 
cultures is happening not only through the mobility of cultural expressions, but also because 
people are moving. Increasing human mobility is an important element of social 
globalization, and it results in personal contacts between different linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious groups. Whether this contact is likely to result in more unity, tolerance or conflict 
will be discussed below. 
On the individual level, social globalization influences identity formation. As the 
nation-state loses its practical and theoretical relevance, national identities are also 
challenged. As individuals are getting more independent, e.g. through advances in 
communication technology, group affiliation is less dependent on geography, and faith, class, 
gender, race, age, sexual orientation etc. are just as relevant for the individual as nationality. 
(Scholte, 2005: 225). Information flows, and the Internet in particular, allows for creation of 
communities completely independent of geography and nationality, and anyone with Internet 
access can form and develop their identity in a virtual network of likeminded. 
On a societal level, social globalization challenges traditional structures and 
hierarchies. As cultures or civilizations interact, their values and ideas of right and wrong are 
challenging each other as well as influencing each other. Social globalization may affect 
society from the bottom-up or top-down. A bottom-up effect comes from technological 
advances in computing and transport. These give people more individual freedom, and 
providing that the new technologies are increasingly available to lower social strata, they can 
be expected to reduce the importance of traditional social hierarchies. Regular people are 
more able to get information about the world, making them less dependant on society elites. A 
top-down effect is that socially, too, policy makers may be pressured to change policies in 
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order to be internationally competitive. For instance, Moses (2005) expects the mobility of 
workers to result in better social conditions as national governments try to attract valuable 
labor; much in the same way they are adopting liberal economic policies to attract investors. 
That is, in an increasingly globalized economy investors can easily move their money to 
where they are offered the best conditions, and the same logic could be applied to an 
increasingly globalized labor market. If people are free to move where they like, policy 
makers are given an incentive to improve social conditions to attract the most qualified 
workers. However, worker mobility has more natural restrictions than investment mobility (it 
is easier to move your money to a foreign country than to leave your home), which limits the 
effectiveness of this argument. 
 
2.1.4 Political Globalization 
Political globalization denotes the shift of power from the national to the supranational and 
international level through countries’ membership in supranational and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and through the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and multinational corporations (MNCs). This means more international interdependence and 
less national sovereignty, which can be a source of vulnerability, but it can also improve the 
nation’s ability to handle global problems (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 60).  In the form of 
embassies and diplomats, or organized citizen activism on global issues, political 
globalization entails the growth of a global political and civil society (Scholte, 2005: 222). 
Thus, while decreasing sovereignty, globalization also increases the possibility of influencing 
others; international organizations exert power over nations and individuals, but both nations 
and individuals have more power to influence global actors and other nations’ governments. 
Political globalization is important to be aware of because of its implications for how 
we understand the world. The conventional way of ordering and systemizing the world, in 
daily life and in research, is in states. The world is thus perceived as a whole made up of 
many separate components. But because of its decreasing sovereignty, the national 
perspective is getting less relevant (Moses and Brigham, 2007), both in theory and in practice. 
When states lose power they lose causal relevance, meaning that studies of causal 
relationships need to take into account the actors that have taken over some of this power. For 
example, if we want to know why Norway is represented with military forces in Afghanistan, 
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we need to look beyond the state level and consider the causal effect of NATO3 membership. 
Scholte (2005: 185) claims that ‘globalization has rendered the statist mode of governance 
non-viable’, but Rodrik (1997b) reminds us that so far, the world is far from completely 
globalized, and states still retain a high level of independence. While we ought to keep global 
relationships and entities in mind, understanding the world in terms of states is not 
misunderstanding, at least not yet. 
Another expression of political globalization is the spread of political ideologies and 
government practices. Democratization4 can therefore be seen as a part of political 
globalization. Held (2006: 94) describes the contemporary form of representative liberal 
democracy as ‘a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the 
majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions 
(that is, decisions affecting the whole community)’. This form of democracy was developed 
in the West, but toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st it has come to be ‘widely 
adopted in principle as a suitable model of government’ all over the world (ibid.: 95). 
Whether following international pressure, pressure from citizens, or changes in ideological 
convictions within the government, the last decades have seen more and more states 
introducing popular elections. Especially after the end of the cold war, representative 
democracy has had hegemony over other models of government, thus contributing to 
globalization of the political world. However, political globalization in the form of spread of 
elections as the legitimate way of appointing political authorities does not necessarily entail a 
corresponding spread of democratic civil society. Critics argue that simply holding elections 
does not automatically make a country a democracy (Collier, 2010). A deeper form of 
democratization would also involve strengthening of institutions and the rule of law, reducing 
corruption etcetera, as well as strengthening of civil society and democratic ideals such as 
tolerance and freedom of speech. 
 
2.2 Globalization: Blessing or Curse? 
Globalization is a wide-ranging phenomenon, and it could have an equally wide range of 
consequences. Globalization might bring development and peace, or inequality and 
exploitation. It may strengthen institutions and contribute to a stable community, or it may 
                                                
3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
4 The word ‘democratization’ is used here in the meaning ‘regime change toward representative liberal 
democracy’. 
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cause instability simply by being a process of change: ‘globalization has invariably 
contributed to a backdrop of uncertainty that tends to accompany any significant social 
change’ (Scholte, 2005: 315). Scholte (2005) sums up a lot of the debate around globalization 
and whether it is positive or negative for the world. He discusses its influence on various 
issues using the categories equality, democracy, and security. I will be focusing on 
globalization’s relationship with internal security, but before circling in on that issue it is 
useful to give a brief summary of how it can affect other areas of society. These areas may in 
turn be related to internal conflict: if globalization has consequences for equality and 
democracy, this is likely to have implications for internal security, too. 
 
2.2.1 Equality 
Globalization is hardly the original cause of social inequalities (ibid.: 346). However, some 
aspects of globalization can expand already existing gaps in society, other aspects can 
contribute to their reduction. Economic globalization has been blamed for increasing 
inequalities between the global North and South, as well as more local class inequalities, 
urban/rural divides, etcetera (ibid.: 316). On the other hand, a stronger global civil society can 
more effectively put such inequalities on the agenda, and advocate equality in other areas of 
society as well, e.g. gender, race, and sexual orientation. Many sides to globalization has the 
potential to promote equal opportunities for people across traditional social stratifications, e.g. 
the spread of new technologies and access to knowledge, but regrettably, many of the benefits 
of globalizing have been concentrated in the North, with younger generations, propertied 
classes, men, and in urban areas (ibid.: 345). 
 
2.2.2 Democracy 
Globalization can also be criticized for being undemocratic (ibid.: 348). How so? According 
to Scholte, ‘democracy prevails when the members of a public determine – collectively, 
equally, freely, openly, and responsibly – the policies that shape their joint destinies’ (2005: 
349). By reinforcing existing inequalities in society, globalization makes less attainable the 
ideal of equal democratic participation. Uneven distribution of economic, academic, and 
social capital means the ‘public’ cannot participate in democratic rule on equal terms. The 
imbalance between potential democratic participants is reinforced by the shift of power away 
from the traditional governmental structures. This development can be argued to be 
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undemocratic in itself, not only because of its consequences for equal and collective 
participation. Even if nation-based democracy spreads around the world, a shift toward a 
more supranational power structure implies that this type of democracy is not adequate; 
‘[g]lobal democracy needs more than a democratic state’ (ibid.: 354). The diminishing 
importance of national borders entails opportunities and freedoms, but also decreases the 
public’s power to control and regulate themselves, even in the most democratic of nations 
(ibid.: 354). However, globalization opens up for other forms of democratic participation 
through growth of a civil society, and global diffusion of knowledge and information 
facilitates more informed and responsible democratic action. What is more, such diffusion of 
knowledge should surely be regarded as valuable in itself, regardless of its impact on 
democracy. 
 
2.2.3 Security 
Human security is also affected by globalization. When Scholte (2005) talks about security he 
does not solely mean freedom from war or violence, but a much broader notion of security 
covering virtually all areas of society. Environmental changes, for instance, have 
consequences for security both locally and globally. As economic globalization increases 
production efficiency through industrialization, there are bound to be consequences for the 
natural environment. Pollution, deforestation, global warming, and so on are byproducts of 
increasingly global industrialization and transportation of people and products across the 
world. Additionally, the globalization of businesses is likely to affect how companies deal 
with environmental challenges. While local businesses have a rational incentive to preserve 
the environment they operate in, large multinational corporations are more disconnected from 
the feeling of local responsibility. On the other hand, small local businesses may have to ‘do 
what they have to do’ to survive without having the luxury of being environmentally 
conscious. Larger companies are more likely to be under pressure from environmental 
organizations, and to actually have the means to take such considerations into account. The 
same logic can be applied to the strengthening of worker’s rights, and human rights in 
general. Political globalization can thus be a positive influence on the environment, both 
natural and social, through supra- or international agreements and the watchdog function of a 
global civil society. Whether this function is successfully exercised is, however, questionable. 
Still, global industries have contributed to security by creating jobs (ibid.: 297). By enhancing 
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economic growth and creating job opportunities, globalization increases financial security. By 
globalizing economic crises, though, it can cause great insecurity and instability (ibid.: 294). 
Migration, increased travelling, and transportation of products from distant places has 
consequences in terms of health security, too (ibid.: 288). Diseases travel further and faster. 
Then again, treatments do, too, as knowledge of and access to medical treatments is diffused 
across borders. So is knowledge and information more generally, through global networks of 
communication. But, according to Scholte, this globalizing of networks comes at a price: 
‘[p]eople who are glued to television and computer screens may have virtual bonds across the 
planet but little or no acquaintance with persons living next door’ (2005: 309). By challenging 
traditional identities and communities, by changing the way we look at ourselves, and others, 
globalization has implications for the social and cultural aspects of human security, too. On 
the one hand, global networks facilitate the expression of identity in a different way than in a 
more geographically bound world (ibid. 305). Anyone with access to the Internet can find a 
community of likeminded, and more geographical mobility makes it easier even to relocate to 
a place where ones identity and/or culture can be expressed. On the other hand, this 
‘expansion’ of the world may compromise social cohesion and the security of a local 
community. Lack of social cohesion and social capital may in turn affect security by increase 
crime rates (ibid.: 308). Criminals are also benefiting from global networks and markets, 
facilitating better organization, drug trafficking etcetera.  
As for warfare, globalization has negative and positive implications. It entails the 
spread of weapons technology and global arms markets, and the effectiveness of diasporas 
(Scholte, 2005: 312). Globalization of the media makes terrorism a more effective strategy 
(ibid.: 284). Globalization also reinforces interests beyond national borders, which can in 
some ways strengthen governments’ incentives for military operations across the globe. 
Ranging from UN peacekeeping missions to USA led invasions, some of these are arguably 
more constructive than others. International economic interdependence can also be a strong 
incentive for keeping the peace between nations. Don’t fight a country if a downturn in his 
economy is going to cause a downturn in yours, or leave you without the goods he supplies 
you. Political and social interconnectedness should contribute to the same effect. Theories of 
the ‘liberal peace’, the ‘capitalist peace’, the ‘democratic peace’, and so on contend that 
globalization decreases the likelihood that countries engage in international conflicts through 
modernization, development, economic growth, and democratization (Doyle, 2012). Liberal 
democracies do not fight other liberal democracies (ibid.), and by contributing to development 
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toward liberal democracy and economic prosperity, globalization can promote international 
peace. However, it is difficult to know the causal direction, or if it is simply a spurious 
correlation (Nye, 2009: 49). Moreover, even if liberal democracy does cause peace in the long 
run, the risk of war is increased in early stages of democratic transition (ibid.: 50).  
 
2.2.4 Globalization: A Bit of Both 
None of the problems presented here are solely globalization’s fault, though, and many of the 
problems blamed on globalization have been exaggerated; SARS did not turn into the global 
plague it was hyped up to be, and the computer systems of the world survived the Y2K 
millennium bug (Scholte, 2005: 311).  Moreover, even where globalization has in fact caused 
troubles they may very well be possible to avoid by choosing alternative approaches to 
globalization, rather than by eliminating it completely. Scholte criticizes neoliberalist policy 
choices rather than global relations as such, arguing that ‘(…) the harms have resulted not 
from increased globality as such, but from the policies that have been adopted towards it’ 
(Scholte, 2005: 278). Although not being the sole cause of all the problems of the world, 
Scholte argues that ‘globalization has invariably contributed to a backdrop of uncertainty that 
tends to accompany any significant social change’ (2005: 315).  
Since globalization is such a multifaceted phenomenon, deciding whether 
globalization is good or bad for the world as a whole is of course impossible. It works 
differently on different areas of human life, and it has both positive and negative implications 
for each of these areas (Scholte, 2005: 311). To quote Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 181): 
 
‘(…) [G]lobalization and internationalization have mixed results. The same processes 
that allowed the United States to plant secret detention centers in Eastern Europe and 
Afghanistan also exposed those abuses to global public opinion. Similarly, the same 
processes that contribute to the creation of ‘good’ NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch facilitated the formation and mobility of the 
murderers of September 11, 2001.’ 
 
It seems the answer to the headline is that globalization can be both a blessing and a curse, 
and finding out which element of it is which requires asking more detailed questions. I have 
chosen to concentrate on globalization’s relationship with security; more specifically, how it 
affects different forms of violent internal conflict. 
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2.3 What is Internal Conflict? 
2.3.1 Spontaneous vs. Organized Conflict 
Internal conflict, like globalization, is a term that can encompass many things. Internal 
conflicts may range from peaceful demonstrations to deadly and destructive civil wars, from 
conflicts between groups to conflicts between less coherent collections of people. I limit my 
definition of internal conflict to include only violent forms of conflict. While non-violent 
conflict can be a legitimate way of working out issues, once the conflict turns violent it 
becomes harmful to people, economic activities, and/or society in general in a much greater 
degree. Peaceful protest, for instance, is a legitimate form of political participation, a way for 
people to communicate their views to the government and can thus be viewed as a democratic 
action. Still, there are many forms of violence, from unorganized clashes between groups of 
citizens or citizens and the government, to highly organized military conflicts. Collier et al. 
(2003: 56) illustrate the differences between different internal conflicts with political protest 
movements and military organizations. Political protest movements may riot and partake in 
violent events, but they can be unstructured groups, while private military organizations need 
structure, typically a highly hierarchical organization with a charismatic leader on top. 
Moreover, protest movements do not by far require the same amount of financing that a 
military group does; participation is usually part-time and voluntary, while an army has great 
material needs both in terms of equipment and keeping its (full-time) soldiers fed (ibid.).  
Most studies on internal conflict focus on civil war, but the great variation between the 
different conflict types makes it plausible that the mechanisms that lie behind them vary as 
well, making other conflicts equally interesting to study. Different conflicts can be loosely 
divided into ‘spontaneous’ and ‘organized’ conflicts. For a systematic understanding of the 
differences between conflict types, I apply a two-dimensional framework: first, internal 
conflicts may vary in the size and structure of their organization, and second, in level of 
popular involvement. They differ also in the instruments applied by their actors. The violent 
conflicts with low requirements for organization and popular participation are the most 
‘spontaneous’, while conflicts that generally need more structure and involve society to a 
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larger degree are termed the most ‘organized’ conflicts.5 Looking again at the example from 
Collier et al. (2003: 56) above, the riots of the political protest movement is the most 
spontaneous type of conflict, while civil war of the private military organization is the most 
organized. Riots do not require a high level of organization, nor do they necessarily entail 
extensive public involvement – they can be local events. The parts in a civil war, on the other 
hand, have much greater need for organization, and the conflict generally involves and/or 
affects a large part of the population. Many internal conflicts are of course somewhere in 
between the poles ‘spontaneous’ or ‘organized’. Some riots escalate from local events to 
large-scale popular uprisings, to armed rebellions, without automatically gaining the 
organizational structure of a private military organization. Revolutions may have these 
characteristics. Some military groups may be professional and organized, yet not large enough 
to take on a government army in a civil war, and instead operate through sabotage, bombing 
of government targets or other sporadic violent attacks. This type of warfare characterizes 
guerrilla war. Table 2.1 is a classification of different conflicts, highly simplified, but useful 
as an illustration of the differences and commonalities of different types of violent internal 
conflict, ordered (top to bottom) from the most spontaneous to the most organized.6 
 
Table 2.1 Violent Internal Conflict Characteristics 
 
2.3.2 Causes of Conflict 
The variation within types of internal conflict is reflected in the variations in theoretical 
explanations for why and how it occurs. Traditionally the theories explain what is necessary 
for conflicts to arise, whereas more recently the focus has also been on what is necessary for 
                                                
5 ‘Spontaneous’ conflicts may indeed turn into ‘organized’ ones, but in other cases a country may 
experience a number of sporadic violent episodes without the situation ever escalating into armed 
conflicts between organized groups. 
6 It is debatable whether riots and revolutions are always violent, but my focus here is on the violent 
kind. 
Conflict type Organization Participation Instruments 
Riot Low Low Violent demonstration 
Revolution Low High Armed rebellion 
Guerrilla war High Low Sporadic armed activity, sabotage, terrorism 
Civil war High High Armed rebellion !
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the conflicts to persist. The first type of theories is useful for explaining spontaneous 
violence, while the second is useful for explaining organized conflict. 
The mobilization of spontaneous conflicts can be explained by collective action theory 
(Tilly, 1978; Olson, 1965) and relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970). In From Mobilization 
to Revolution Tilly (1978) presents a mobilization model that explains how and why 
collective action occurs. It is useful for understanding popular movements like 
demonstrations, riots, and in the more extreme cases, revolutions. The main elements in the 
model are interest, organization, mobilization, and opportunity, and the balance between them 
influences the intensity, range, and nature of the outcome: the collective action. People have 
to have an interest in common in order to organize as a group and/or be mobilized for 
collective action. Opportunity to act collectively is also necessary, and opportunity depends 
on e.g. the level of repression in a country, the group’s power relative to other groups or to 
what extend they feel threatened. A paradox in collective action theory is that if a group is 
taking collective action to obtain a public good, this good will be available to anyone in the 
public whether they themselves acted or not, making it more attractive to be a ‘free-rider’ than 
investing in the collective action (Olson, 1965). If the personal cost of engaging in collective 
action is bigger than the prospective outcome, it will be in everyone’s personal interest not to 
act, eliminating a vital element of Tilly’s model. However, this is assuming that people are 
rational, calculating actors, which is far from always the case. There may also be incentives to 
be an active member of the group on top of the public good that the collective action seeks to 
obtain, e.g. pressure, friendship or additional goods reserved for active members. 
Relative deprivation is a term in social psychology that describes ‘the perception that 
one is less well off than others with whom one compares oneself’ (Myers, 2008: 351). Gurr 
(1970: 37) calls it a ‘perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value 
capabilities’. The discrepancy can result from (1) capabilities falling while expectations stay 
the same, (2) capabilities staying the same while expectations rise, or (3) expectations and 
capabilities both rising, but the former at a quicker rate (Gurr, 1970). Either way, relative 
deprivation is thought to breed frustration, which can in turn lead to aggression and 
motivation for spontaneous collective violence (ibid.). 
The theories above set out to explain how conflicts occur spontaneously, i.e. the 
mechanisms behind grass root movements and individual frustrations, the move from no 
conflict to violence. But arguably, there is a gap between explaining the occurrence of 
collective violence and explaining the sustainability of full-scale civil wars. The dominating 
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theoretical perspective in civil war studies today is developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
and Fearon and Laitin (2003). They argue that economy is the best predictor of civil war 
because it says something about the feasibility of staging an uprising, but they interpret the 
results somewhat differently. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that economy is so important 
because it provides motivation for rebellion (people rebel because of greed and/or 
grievances).7 Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that economic factors are not the ‘root cause’ 
as such, but they act as a proxy for state weakness. In Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) view, 
either greedy leaders are seeking to exploit wherever they can and mobilize people for 
rebellion, or grievances are driving people to rebel. In both these situations the theory 
considers armed conflict likely if the anticipated gains outweigh the anticipated costs of 
conflict. States with high per capita income should thus have a lower risk of civil war, as 
people generally will be better off financially and will have less to gain and more to lose by 
engaging in warfare. In a later study they stress that motivation is not the only thing that is 
important; feasibility is a significant factor in explaining civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Rohner, 2009). After all, many countries facing grievances in the form of repression, poverty, 
ethnic abuse, and so on do not experience civil war (Collier et al., 2003). Fearon and Laitin 
(2003: 76) argue that ‘economic variables such as per capita income matter primarily because 
they proxy for state administrative, military, and police capabilities’. When the state’s 
capabilities are weak, it both motivates and makes feasible a rebellion. ‘Where states are 
relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be 
rulers who supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to “tax” for themselves 
and, often, for a larger cause’ (ibid.).  
The theories explaining organized conflict echo Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model, but 
add the element of sustainability. For a large-scale, organized conflict to be realized there 
must not only be motivation and opportunity for a quick rebellion, an organized conflict needs 
more structure and financing, and to not be stuck down by the state before acquiring these. On 
the other hand, organized conflicts steer more clear of the free-rider problem than 
spontaneous ones. If an organization is already in place it is easier to recruit people and 
organize the rebellion. A spontaneous conflict could thus be thought to need more in terms of 
motivation, as it entails the move from passive unorganized individuals to collective action, 
while with organized conflict the organized groups are already there and the group authorities 
                                                
7 According to Collier et al. (2003: 53), the ‘key root cause of [internal] conflict is the failure of 
economic development’.  
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just have to initiate the violence. Still, as such groups have to have become organized at some 
point, we do not escape the free-rider problem entirely when trying to explain them, either. 
 
2.4 How Does Globalization Affect Internal Conflict? 
With the key terms explained, I can start tackling the question of how they relate to each 
other. In this section I assess what influence globalization may have on internal conflict.  
 
2.4.1 Overall Globalization and Internal Conflict 
Globalization in the broad sense could represent significant positive development through 
increasing economic growth, political cooperation, and knowledge and information flows. If 
this is the case it should be expected to diminish both the motivations and opportunity for 
internal conflict. Scholte (2005: 346) argues that globalization per se is not what creates 
conflicts and that rather it is all about how globalization is handled. Higher levels of 
globalization may provide countries with institutional strengths that let countries avoid some 
of the problems of increasing globalization, as well as other challenges (Tsai, 2007: 122). 
Through improved social mechanisms and economic growth globalization can give the state 
more resources, making them more able to improve the population’s living standard, and 
thereby enhancing the state’s legitimacy and increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion 
(Nieman, 2011: 282). 
 
H1a: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict. 
 
On the other hand, McGrew (2007: 27) argues that modern intrastate and transstate conflicts 
are sustained by ‘the capacity of combatants to exploit global networks to provide finance, 
arms, émigré support, or aid as well as to facilitate profiteering, racketeering, and shadow 
economies, such as the diamond trade, which pays for arms and influence’. Global networks 
in the economic, social, and political sense influence the face of warfare. By facilitating the 
access to means, globalization helps make internal conflicts possible. 
 
H1b: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict. 
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Different types of conflict do have things in common, but as previously discussed, they also 
have important differences. Because of this, some features of globalization could be expected 
to matter more to spontaneous forms of conflict than to organized conflicts, and vice versa. 
As previously discussed, high-scale, high-organization internal conflicts require different 
conditions than lower-scale, spontaneous forms of conflict to be feasible. They are more 
feasible if rebel groups have sufficient economic funding, good organizational methods, if the 
state is weak enough to not crush them before they evolve from protest into war, and if the 
geography of the country enables asymmetric wars. Spontaneous violent conflicts do not 
require these things to the same degree. One does not need a rebel army to riot, nor 
mountainous terrain to stage a political protest, but to get mobilized they may require more in 
external motivation to make up for what they lack in organization, and societal changes that 
influence collective interest could be of particular relevance for them. Because different 
conflicts require different things, the explanatory factors for riots may be different from those 
of civil war. Conditions that make a country prone for spontaneous conflicts may not make 
them prone for civil war. In that way, the economic, social, and political conditions in a 
country will influence which conflict type is more likely. Globalization influences these 
conditions in different ways, and consequently globalization will affect the risk of one 
conflict type in a different way than another. 
 
H2: Overall globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
 
2.4.2 Economic Globalization and Internal Conflict 
The economic side of globalization is the most widely studied and debated part of the 
phenomenon, but there is no consensus on whether it is nurturing peace or war. Hegre, 
Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) sort the debaters into two main camps: liberalists and 
structuralists. The main liberal argument is that high levels of trade and free markets lead to 
economic growth, development, and in turn to peace, and this is backed by a number of 
empirical analyses (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003; Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999). 
Liberalism is well established both with academics and policy makers. The values and 
fundamental philosophy behind economic globalization as a positive force dates back to 
liberalists in the 18th and 19th century, and the idea that economic interdependence promotes 
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peace is evident in the developments particularly in the western world after World War I and 
World War II. The European Union is based in large part on the conviction that nations that 
are trading partners and economically dependent on one another will have too much to lose 
going to war with each other. Children of the same era are the WTO (as a descendent of 
GATT), the IMF, and the World Bank – huge promoters of economic globalization. But even 
if it might promote international peace, does economic globalization necessarily have the 
same effect on internal conflict? Yes, liberalists will argue, through generating economic 
growth. The countries that experience the most change in level of globalization are, more or 
less by definition, developing nations. Mishkin (2006: ix) argues that ‘[i]nstead of a danger, 
globalization is an opportunity’, and goes on to lay out concrete advice to ‘disadvantaged 
nations’ on how to ‘harness their financial systems to get rich’. Economic globalization’s 
positive effect for low-development nations is supported empirically; De Soysa (2003) comes 
to the conclusion that trade and FDI benefits low-development countries through economic 
growth. Since poverty seems to be a source of conflict, economic globalization should then 
reduce the risk of internal conflicts.8 Besley and Persson (2011) show that higher wages 
reduce the likelihood of political violence. With higher wages, the opportunity cost is higher, 
and the net gain from engaging in conflict is lower for both non-government and government 
actors. Said in a different way, more welfare and higher wages increase the recruitment cost 
for rebels, making it harder for rebellion to be financially viable (Hegre, Gissinger, and 
Gleditsch, 2003). As for the government, higher wages means higher tax revenues, and 
consequentially more to lose should a serious conflict occur, as such conflicts can be 
economically destructive. De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) contend that war is an economic 
venture. They argue that ‘closed economies provide a high payoff to organizing ‘illegal’ 
economic activities that in weak state environments develop into organized armed activity 
(…)’, and thus that economic openness is pacifying (ibid.: 295-296). Globalization could 
therefore be expected to decrease the risk of internal conflict, especially the more organized 
types of conflict where soldiers need to be paid or fed and where greed is a motivation. 
 
H3a: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the lower the risk of 
internal conflict. 
                                                
8 Even if there is high correlation between poverty and conflict it is worth asking which way the 
causality goes. The answer is probably both – economic grievance motivates conflict, but is also a 
consequence of it, particularly for major conflicts like civil war. 
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However, the pacifying effect of globalization through national economic growth is based on 
the presupposition that this growth benefits citizens relatively equally. The structuralist 
argument is that economic globalization is increasing inequalities both on a national and 
global level, and that this in turn is increasing instability, making conflict more likely (Hegre, 
Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003; Rodrik, 1997; Peet, 2009; Buckman, 2004; Doyle, 2007: 
197). Thus, for economic globalization to decrease the risk of conflict, the pacifying effect of 
economic growth needs to outweigh the aggravating effect of economic inequality. Chua 
(2004) argues that free market economy in several cases is shown to enable ethnic minorities 
to gain economic dominance over the majority. This hardens the divide between the ethnic 
groups and breeds hatred, toward the minority in particular, and increases the risk of internal 
conflict9. 
The empirical studies are divided on the structuralist theory. Bussmann, De Soysa, and 
Oneal (2005) find that economic globalization has no significant effect on income 
inequalities, strengthening the liberal argument, while Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) 
report that trade does indeed increase income inequality, but at the same time, that it has no 
statistically significant relationship with civil war. The liberal standpoint appears, then, to be 
the most convincing when studying trade and FDI, as they would decrease grievances, and 
according to Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003: 8), ‘[f]ew scholars today question the 
belief that economic integration generally brings economic benefits and peace (…)’. Even so, 
Tsai (2007) reports a small, but negative effect of economic globalization on human well-
being. This, he says, may not be because of the economic integration as such (trade, FDI etc.), 
but because it is often accompanied by neo-liberal policies that reduce the government’s 
social spending. Scholte (2005: 279) echoes that explanation. The first dimension of 
economic globalization (as described above) in the form of increased trade and FDI may be 
pacifying, but other features of economic globalization might influence conflict differently. 
The globalization of markets does not only entail the flow of goods and finances, but the flow 
of labor, too. Because of this, workers may experience more instability (Kaplinsky, 2001). 
Rodrik (1997a: 27, 1997b) explains that ‘(…) workers now find themselves in an 
                                                
9 If the majority gains political power (through democratization, in Chua’s theory), this leads to one of 
three things: either a backlash against markets (deglobalization), a backlash against democracy, or 
backlash against the market-dominant minority (internal conflict, genocide). Chua’s theory involves a 
lot of conditions (e.g. conditions of ethnic composition and level of democratization), though, and is 
therefore not very generalizable. 
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environment in which they can be more easily ‘exchanged’ for workers in other countries. For 
those who lack the skills to make themselves hard to replace, the result is greater insecurity 
and a more precarious existence’. Additionally, the second dimension of economic 
interdependence – liberalizing policy changes – may influence the domestic social 
arrangements in a negative way (Rodrik, 1997a). For instance, cheaper production can be 
achieved by allowing child labor and bad conditions for workers. No doubt, a precarious 
existence and bad working conditions can breed frustration, thereby increasing the risk of 
internal conflict. 
Economic globalization may also fire up internal conflicts over ownership of natural 
resources that are valuable on the global market, as privatization decreases national cohesion 
and local groups strive to control what is ‘rightfully’ theirs. This can play out and lead to 
conflict through increasing the motivational power both of greed and grievance. One 
possibility is that local actors may fight the government for control of sellable natural 
resources. If there is suddenly a global market that is interested in your local resources, it is 
tempting to claim them for yourself and cash in the profit, rather than let it go to the 
government. The prospective output of engaging in collective action is increased, as is the 
financial viability of an organized violent movement. Another possibility is that the state may 
neglect local considerations in favor of foreign investments. If the state sells the rights to 
resources that are traditionally used by local actors, e.g. farmland, to foreign actors, this can 
create severe problems for the local population and cause both spontaneous and organized 
internal conflict because the local group may feel threatened, experience grievances, and so 
on. 
Another unpleasant side effect of a globalized economy is the vulnerability that comes 
with being so dependent on others. The financial recession that started in 2007 is an example 
of how a crisis in one state’s economy can quickly spread to the whole world. A consequence 
of such crises is that value capabilities drop, but value expectations are likely to stay the same. 
In other words, it causes a drop in living standards, while the expectations of what living 
standard should be like may not change. This can destabilize societies and create both relative 
and absolute deprivation that increases the risk of internal conflict. 
 
H3b: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the higher the risk of 
internal conflict. 
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Relative deprivation theory is, as previously discussed, one of the major theoretical 
approaches to explaining spontaneous conflicts. Economic globalization could increase this 
feeling of deprivation through economic crises, but also through economic growth. It may 
create economic growth for only a portion of the population, producing internal inequalities 
and motivation for violent conflict. More specifically relevant to organized conflict is the 
possibility of economic globalization increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion, as well as 
increasing state capability (i.e. institutional strength and capability of offering welfare 
services to their citizens), thereby making organized rebellions less feasible. 
 
H4: Economic globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
 
If economic grievances and deprivation were the only potential conflict-bringing 
consequences of globalization, the negative effect might be preventable by providing 
economic compensation. However, Bussmann and Schneider (2007) show that neither social 
spending or foreign aid reduce the increase in risk of conflict following economic 
globalization. This suggests that it could be something related to the economic changes, but 
not the economy in itself, creating discontent; it might be related to more general societal 
changes. 
 
2.4.3 Social Globalization and Internal Conflict 
Social globalization can be thought to have a negative effect on internal stability in that it 
entails actual movement of people and thus higher potential for cultures to clash, dissolving of 
communities, and loss of social capital and safety nets. A recurring theme in assessments of 
the consequences of social globalization is how it affects identity. In ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations?’ (1993) Samuel P. Huntington describes the type of conflict he thinks the world 
will see more of as it moves into the future. As the world shrinks and different civilizations 
interact more, conflicts will occur not on the basis of political differences, but along cultural 
divides. Globalization, he says, is ‘separating people from longstanding local identities’, 
weakening national identity and often leaving religion to fill the gap (ibid.: 26). Through 
changes in identity formation, social globalization can be expected to increase the likelihood 
of internal conflict. As the nation-state loses relevance economically and politically, so does 
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national identity. In the process of globalization, ‘(…) other aspects of self and solidarity have 
acquired increased prominence (…)’ (Scholte, 2005: 225). With social globalization, the 
individuals’ solidarity increasingly shifts from national to other groups. This could result in a 
clash of civilizations as well as mean less intrastate unity and solidarity, and contribute to the 
change in the nature of conflicts from international conflict to ‘new wars’ – intrastate or 
transstate conflicts (McGrew, 2007: 27).  
Huntington claims that there has been an increase in ethnically and culturally based 
conflicts after the end of the cold war, but critics claim that this supposed increase is a 
misreading of the data, and that ‘most ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity is not 
politically destabilizing’ (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 248). But many scholars find that ethnic 
and religious heterogeneity is related to conflict (Gurr, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 
2002; Chua, 2004; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman, Weidemann, and 
Gleditsch, 2011). The trouble with ethnicity and religion is that they potentially create strong 
in-group solidarity and the opposite toward out-groups. Especially if there are horizontal 
inequalities (whether economic or political) between ethnic groups, the risk of internal 
conflict will be increased (Chua, 2004; Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Cederman, 
Weidemann, and Gleditsch, 2011). Reynal-Querol (2002) emphasizes the special standing of 
religion. To a vast amount of people it is an important source of identity and motivation for 
action, and you cannot have more than one religious affiliation. You can belong to more than 
one ethnic or national group (you can be half Sámi, half Chinese), but you cannot be half 
Christian, half Muslim. This makes religion an especially powerful factor in division of 
societies, and therefore a potential cause of internal conflict in religiously heterogeneous 
countries. If social globalization influences identity in a way that increases the importance of 
ethnicity and religion and decreases the importance of nationality it increases the risk of such 
conflicts. Granted, in many countries, especially non-Western, national identity has never 
been particularly strong and in many cases it is trumped by tribal, ethnic or territorial identity. 
Claiming that people in Afghanistan have strong tribal identities because social globalization 
has eroded national identity would be misguided at best. Even so, if social globalization 
reduces the importance of nationality where nationality has traditionally been strong, it will 
increase the risk of internal conflict. 
Erosion of nationality is not the only element of social globalization that can affect 
internal conflict. Global interactions challenge traditional values and identities more 
generally, too. Lieber and Weisberg (2002: 273) assess Huntington’s argument and contend 
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that the cultural aspect of globalization leads to ‘not so much a clash of civilizations as a clash 
within civilizations’. They argue that strong reactions to globalization are more likely in 
countries with strong traditional values, which generally puts developing countries more at 
risk. Nieman (2011: 267) talks about ‘globalization shocks’, arguing that globalization may 
lead to internal conflict if the state is not equipped to handle the ‘grievances of domestic 
actors that lose in the face of increased competition or face challenges to traditional ways of 
life’. Parts of social globalization can be interpreted as modernization, westernization, or just 
Americanization (Barber, 1992; Conversi, 2010). To the degree that social globalization is 
indeed a unidirectional process it is likely to cause trouble internally as well as causing anti-
western or anti-American attitudes. In the western, highly globalized societies, there is 
traditionally a stronger notion of individualism and personal identity, in contrast to societies 
(often in developing countries) that put more emphasis on group identities. These societies in 
particular can experience higher levels of frustration because of this identity crisis that is a 
clash between its established norms and a more individualistic way of thinking. Seen through 
the lens of collective action theory, this threat to traditional power can result in reactive 
collective action (Tilly, 1978). 
Social globalization entails an increased flow of information and potential knowledge, 
as well as exchange of cultural elements. Such developments could very well be thought to 
lead to more solidarity, mutual understanding, and tolerance, rather than clashes and war. 
Increased knowledge, tolerance, and increasingly similar values and cultures ought to lead to 
less tension and conflict (Scholte, 2000). On the other hand, this cultural development is not 
necessarily something that occurs in all social strata (Tsai, 2007: 115), and it may benefit only 
the more privileged who have the resources to engage in global cultural exchange. This could 
mean social exclusion (Munck, 2005), increasing (domestic) social inequality, frustration, and 
conflict. More communication, both digitally and in terms of people travelling and moving, 
means more transparency, and while this may breed understanding and tolerance, it also lets 
people become aware of their rights and get better means to do something about it. Being 
tolerant towards e.g. other ethnic or religious groups does not necessarily mean being tolerant 
toward an oppressive government. Moreover, both actual and perceived inequalities can 
create tensions, and according to relative deprivation theory, comparing one’s lot to the lives 
of the better off creates a feeling of deprivation and discontent (Gurr, 1970). Increased flows 
of information may lead to increased discrepancy between actual and expected standard of 
living, in both economic and social terms. Being informed about other value systems and 
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civilizations invites critical assessment of ones own social situation, knowing the options that 
are ‘out there’. The conclusion may be that ‘the others have it better’, which creates 
motivation for demanding change, and increased knowledge can thus increase frustrations and 
create motivation for both spontaneous riots and organized rebellion. A different conclusion, 
however, could be that ‘we have it better’, which could result in a protective or defensive state 
of mind and more domestic solidarity. But in the modern, high-mobility world where people 
from different civilizations live inside the same national boundaries (e.g. in the United 
States), such intracultural solidarity could be polarizing and increase the risk of internal 
conflict, ranging from riots to civil war. 
One of the main concerns critics have with social globalization is its socially 
destabilizing effect, both through increased mobility and the consequences of cultural 
changes. If the social structure of a society is broken down or radically altered there will be a 
reduction of social capital. This, in turn, reduces the opportunity cost of conflict, making 
rebellion more likely (Nieman, 2011). If you have trouble finding your place in a changing 
community with weakened social safety nets, there is less to lose by going to war.  
 
H5a: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal 
conflict. 
 
Still, with all these possible dangers of social globalization, the potentially pacifying effects 
of increased tolerance, knowledge, and merging cultures should not be underestimated.  Such 
positive developments could very well make up for many of the negative factors. Moreover, 
the increasing mobility of workers may actually lead to improvement of social conditions as 
states try to attract skilled labor. Moses (2005: 70) argues that ‘in the same way that states 
today compete by offering attractive investment havens for mobile capital, we might expect 
states in a free migration context to compete with one another for mobile citizens/labor’. 
According to this logic, social globalization should be associated with a decrease in 
frustration among the population and consequently less tensions and grievances. 
 
H5b: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal 
conflict. 
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Some features of social globalization are of particular relevance to spontaneous forms of 
conflict. The changes it causes in identity formation weaken national identity and strengthen 
alternative group solidarity. This may result in intranational fractionalization and/or 
polarization, and stronger notions of collective interest within these non-national groups, 
facilitating collective action. Immigration is very likely to contribute to this development. As 
for organized conflicts, they may also increase with social globalization, but for other reasons. 
Improved communications within and across borders, e.g. the Internet and airfare, facilitates 
new ways of organizing and even reduces the requirements for good organization. The 
combination of migration and improved communications increases the likelihood of diasporas 
providing organizational and economic support to a group involved in internal conflict. 
 
H6: Social globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
 
2.4.4 Political Globalization and Internal Conflict 
Political globalization in the form of IGO membership might reduce internal conflict in that 
when the world is watching, governments will be more interested in meeting the demands of 
dissatisfied groups, reducing their grievances instead of using violent means to solve the 
problem (Naghshpour and St. Marie, 2008). Besley and Persson (2011) find empirical support 
for this line of reasoning when examining the relationship between UN Security Council 
membership and internal political violence. They argue that such membership may ‘change a 
country’s international accountability, reducing the likelihood that its government engages in 
violence’ (ibid.: 1432). This effect may also be expected for other international memberships, 
as governments are more likely to adhere to international laws and norms if they seek political 
allies, economic aid, and other benefits that motivate international engagement. Let us say 
that a state wants to be part of an organization, and the organization in question demands a 
certain adherence to e.g. human rights. The expected result would be less internal conflict 
because the government would have incentive to try and solve internal issues in a non-violent 
manner, and internal grievances would decrease. The same sort of effect can be expected for 
the presence of foreign embassies; they function as watchdogs. However, correlation is no 
proof of causality: serious internal conflicts may cause foreign embassies to leave the country. 
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Political globalization may also decrease the risk of internal conflict by strengthening 
political institutions. Fearon and Laitin (2003) agree, as mentioned, with Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) that economic variables are good predictors 
of civil war, but argue that this is not because of the economic factors as such but because 
they are proxies for state capability. By this reasoning, the strength of the state is a better 
determinant of civil war onset. Besley and Persson (2011) find that variables that increase the 
risk of political violence have a stronger effect if political institutions in a country are weak. 
Having weak political institutions makes internal conflict more feasible. This is reflected in 
the fact that stable regimes are less likely to experience conflict than unstable ones (Hegre et 
al., 2001; Ellingsen, 2000). 
 
H7a:  The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal 
conflict. 
 
On the other hand, if political globalization encourages democratization because of diffusion 
of political ideology or a state’s need to appear attractive in the global market, it can be a 
destabilizing force rather than a strengthening one. Both stable autocracies and stable 
democracies are less conflict prone than intermediate regimes, suggesting that 
democratization is a dangerous process (Hegre et al., 2005). Political globalization in the form 
of international pressure to democratize governmental institutions may have the effect that a 
democratic façade is put up (i.e. popular elections are held, but more fundamental societal 
structures enabling fair, equal, and informed democratic participation are missing), 
destabilizing the state structure and moving countries into the range of intermediate regimes 
that are more at risk of civil war (Collier, 2010). Presumably, in stable democracies, there are 
other ways to voice discontent than through armed conflict and the opportunity cost is higher, 
and in strong autocracies, the state is good at keeping potential protesters at bay (Hegre, 
Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003). But when the autocracy loosens (or loses) its grip, repression 
is diminished. There will thus be more opportunity for collective action, and an organized 
rebellion will be more feasible as well.  
Another potential issue with political globalization is the democratic problem that 
faces democracies as the elected national government loses power to international actors, who 
in most instances the public has no control over. For instance, the Norwegian public has to 
adhere to EU regulations because of Norway’s membership of the EEA. But, especially 
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because Norway is not a member of the EU, the democratic control that the citizens have over 
the regulations is minimal. This shift in power away from the people could theoretically breed 
frustration with the government and result in revolution. The turbulence and distrust in 
several European countries following the economic recession starting in 2007 is related to 
political as well as economic globalization, as the EU is both an economic and political union. 
 
H7b:  The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the higher the risk of 
internal conflict. 
 
Political globalization also has consequences that could be thought to result in different 
effects on different conflicts. It might create pressure on governments to adopt policies that 
reduce inequalities and deprivation, and pressure to respect human rights, decreasing 
individual motivation and thereby render spontaneous conflicts less likely. However, 
organized conflicts could be enabled by some elements of political globalization. To the 
extent that it weakens autocracies, moving them toward intermediate regimes, political 
globalization is a destabilizing development – decreasing state capacity, and increasing 
conflict feasibility. State capacity and legitimacy may also be decreased regardless of regime 
type as the nation state loses power and relevance. 
 
H8: Political globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
 
2.4.5 Globalization Level vs. Globalization Process 
In the discussions above I have presented arguments both in favor of and against 
globalization. Complicating the matter further, when analyzing globalization’s effect on 
conflict the results are likely to depend on whether we examine the level of globalization or 
the process. The two may have very different implications for conflict proneness. Looking 
only at the level leaves out the fact that it is a process of change, and the time in history and 
the rate at which this process happens is of crucial importance for its effect on society. 
Bussmann and Schneider (2007) combine the liberalist and structuralist predictions for 
economic globalization in what they call the distributional theory of civil conflict. They argue 
that a high level of economic openness reduces the risk of internal conflict, but that ‘the steps 
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toward global economic integration render armed conflict more likely’ (ibid.: 94). In countries 
that are in a transitional period toward a globalized economy, any pacifying effects could be 
outweighed by the dangers of destabilization. This destabilization argument also applies to 
changes in globalization level in other areas of society. The steps toward globalization should 
therefore be expected to have a different relationship with internal conflict than the level of 
globalization in a country.  
 
H9a: Change in level of globalization increases the risk of internal conflict. 
 
Additionally, the size of the ‘steps’ may matter. If the country is globalizing (or 
deglobalizing) slowly, any potential destabilizing effects they could be mitigated, or simply 
unimportant, but if the changes are rapid they are more likely to cause disturbance. Big 
changes over a short period of time can upset a community. Nieman (2011) argues that 
whereas a high level of globalization is beneficial both for states and individuals, globalizing 
in sudden ‘shocks’ can ‘overwhelm the state’s capacity to offset the negative impacts of 
globalization’ (ibid.: 263). Globalization shocks are therefore expected to be more dangerous 
than both globalization level and the process in general. 
 
H9b: Shocks of globalization increase the risk of internal conflict. 
 
2.5 Summing up the Theory 
2.5.1 A Theoretical Model 
The relationship between globalization and internal conflict is an intricate one, particularly 
because both terms include so much, but I have tried to illustrate the main points of their 
relationship in Figure 2.1. I have summed up the explanations for why conflict occurs in the 
words ‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’. Each type of globalization has consequences that affect 
both of these, and both motivation and opportunity influences risk of internal conflict in 
general. But as argued above, motivation is of particular importance to be able to mobilize for 
a spontaneous conflict, and organized conflicts require more in terms of opportunity (because 
of higher feasibility requirements) than do spontaneous ones. 
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Figure 2.1 Different Features of Globalization and How they Influence Risk of Internal 
Conflicts in General, and Different Types of Conflict in Particular 
 
 
 
2.5.2 Hypotheses 
To recap, I list the hypotheses derived in the theory section. There, they are ordered by type of 
globalization, but it can also be useful to arrange them in three categories by other 
commonalities. The first group of hypotheses concerns the effect of globalization level on 
internal conflict in general. These are dual, with one negative and one positive hypothesis for 
each type of globalization. The second group addresses the expected difference in effect by 
conflict type, but do not include a suggested direction. The third group points out an 
expectation of different effects with different operationalizations of globalization.  
 
Different Globalizations 
H1a: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict. 
H1b: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict. 
H3a: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the lower the risk of 
internal conflict. 
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H3b: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the higher the risk of 
internal conflict. 
H5a: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal 
conflict. 
H5b: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal 
conflict. 
H7a:  The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal 
conflict. 
H7b:  The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the higher the risk of 
internal conflict. 
 
Different Conflicts 
H2: Overall globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
H4: Economic globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
H6: Social globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
H8: Political globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict 
differently than the risk of organized internal conflict. 
 
Different Operationalizations 
H9a: Change in level of globalization increases the risk of internal conflict. 
H9b: Shocks of globalization increase the risk of internal conflict. 
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3 Research Design and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
Methodologies in social sciences are often divided into the somewhat vague categories 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Moses and Knutsen (2007) present a more detailed and 
arguably more useful categorization, describing four scientific methods: the experimental 
method, the statistical method, the comparative method, and the case study. For a naturalist, 
these are listed in order from best to worst. A constructivist might claim quite the opposite 
(ibid.: 196). When choosing a methodological approach for this study, I asked myself what 
type of knowledge I was interested in getting. While the experimental method is the most 
appropriate for generalizable knowledge, the case study provides the most in-depth 
understanding of the subject. I opted to go for the most generalizable knowledge, hoping to 
identify some pattern or relationship that applies to more than one or two cases, but because 
experiments are hard to conduct in social science (especially, I might add, in civil war 
studies), I went for the second best: the statistical method. 
Whereas the experimental method is based on manipulating the data itself and 
studying the events that occur as a consequence, with the statistical method we manipulate the 
data on events that have already happened (ibid. 2007: 93). In order to do this in a satisfactory 
manner, we need enough data. A large N is therefore desirable. When studying war this may 
pose a problem. World wars, for instance, are too few that we can draw any generalizable 
conclusions from them. Luckily (for scholars), internal conflict is a relatively common 
occurrence, in one form or another. Making the period of study as long as possible is also a 
way of getting the N count up, but there are limitations to this because data material is usually 
scarcer the further back in time we go, and moreover, it is debatable whether generalizations 
in social sciences can be drawn beyond a certain period of time. Constructivism has a point; 
what was generally true before may not be applicable now.   
Globalization, too, is something that (more or less by definition) happens in all parts 
of the world, and has done so for quite a long time, albeit in different forms and at varying 
pace. I conclude, then, that it possible and meaningful to analyze the relationship between 
internal conflict and globalization by conducting a large-N statistical study. 
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3.2 Sample 
The unit of analysis in the study is country-year. My full dataset covers 165 countries over the 
period from 1970 to 2007. However, because I want to study the effect of the globalization 
process as well as the level (H1a and H1b), the countries that are most relevant are the ones 
where the globalization process – or lack of – has happened within the period of study. If 
countries are included where the substantial part of the globalization process to date happened 
in large part before 1970, the process is not captured by the limited time frame of this study. 
Such countries are therefore less interesting, and more worryingly, if included, they cause the 
study to be biased toward the effect of globalization level, which may affect the results. To 
avoid this bias I exclude 23 high-income OECD10 countries from the main analyses, leaving 
me with a sample of 142 countries.11 As an additional test, however, I run the analyses on the 
full dataset as well to see whether the results are different (see appendix C). If they are, it may 
have implications for other studies of globalization. 
 
3.3 Dependent Variables: Internal Conflict 
3.3.1 More Than Civil War 
Most studies of internal conflict, as well as most theoretical discussions, concentrate on civil 
war or armed conflict. A prevalent definition of war is ‘sustained combat with 1000 battle-
related deaths between/among the combatants per year’ (Sarkees, 2010), and civil war means 
that at least one of the actors is a non-state actor. Some definitions require that one of the 
actors be a state, others include non-state wars in the term. Armed conflict is another term 
much used in civil war studies, and it includes conflicts resulting in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths, as opposed to 1000 (UCDP, 2008). But internal conflict is, as I have argued, not a 
uniform concept, and the mechanisms behind other forms of conflict are worth looking into as 
well. Some lower level spontaneous conflicts may escalate and evolve into organized armed 
conflicts, but others may not, and even if a conflict does not lead to 25 battle-related deaths 
per year it can still be destructive and highly problematic to a community or nation, 
economically, socially, and politically. 
 
                                                
10 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 
11 A list of the excluded countries can be found in appendix A. 
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3.3.2 Spontaneous vs. Organized: Riots and Civil War Onset 
The main dependent variables in my analyses represent the most spontaneous and the most 
organized types of violent internal conflict. Internal conflicts may take on other, intermediate 
forms as well, but as I aim to investigate the difference between spontaneous and organized 
conflict, it makes sense to focus on the outermost points of the scale; it is most relevant to 
study the two forms of conflict that are farthest apart, and there is a theoretical expectation 
that these are affected differently by globalization. However, I have also run the analyses on 
two intermediate conflict forms12 to make the study as comprehensive as its scope allows. A 
table summing up the findings can be found in the last part of the analysis chapter. Variable 
descriptions and the full results from the analyses are presented in appendix D. 
 
Riots 
For the most spontaneous form of internal conflict in this study I use the variable Riots from 
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2011). It is defined as ‘[a]ny violent 
demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force’. Banks’ 
definition is in large part borrowed from Rummel and Tanter (1974). They describe Riots to 
be generally marked by ‘the destruction of property, people being wounded or killed, or by 
the use of the police of riot control equipment such as clubs, guns or water cannons’ (ibid.: 
13). Riots are spontaneous conflicts then, in the sense that they require little organization and 
they may be of very short duration – i.e. they require relatively little opportunity, but more in 
terms of mobilization in order to occur. The original data is coded in number of events per 
year, but to make it comparable to the Civil War variable I have coded it into a dichotomous 
variable where 0 indicates no clashes and 1 indicates one or more clashes.  
 
Civil War 
For the most organized type of conflict in my analysis I employ UCDP/PRIO’s13 Armed 
Conflict Dataset, version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010). 
Internal Armed Conflict is defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (UCDP, 2008). Relative to 
the civil war definition requiring 1000 deaths, this definition has quite a drastically lower 
                                                
12 Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare, both from Banks (2011). 
13 Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo. 
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threshold. For my study, the most interesting divide is between the nature of the conflict 
types, as opposed to the deadliness. The low-scale operationalization of civil war differs from 
the high-scale operationalization in level of deadliness rather than in the nature of, or the form 
of, conflict, and I therefore use the low-scale to capture as many relevant cases as possible. I 
use a variable that is coded 1 if there has been a new intrastate conflict onset or there is more 
than two years since the last observation of the same conflict. 
 
3.4 Independent Variables: Globalization 
3.4.1 More Than Economy 
The bulk of the research that exists on globalization is focused on the economic aspects of the 
phenomenon, often operationalized as trade and FDI as share of GDP. However, using only 
economic openness as an indicator of globalization when studying internal conflict is 
problematic because of endogeneity, as conflict will reduce trade and foreign investment 
(Elbadawi and Hegre, 2008). The Index of Economic Freedom (Miller, Holmes, and Feulner, 
2012) and the Economic Freedom of the World survey (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 2011) 
include more factors than just trade and FDI, but some of these factors are arguably more 
expressions of neoliberal policies than of a globalized economy. The Index of Economic 
Freedom is made up of data from four categories, one of which is open markets, but the three 
others are rule of law, limited government, and (economic) regulatory efficiency. This makes 
it biased toward neoliberal economic policies, diminishing the importance of open markets 
and increasing the weight of good governance policies. Consequently, it would be difficult to 
tell whether any relation to internal conflict using this index would be because of 
globalization, or rather a result of neoliberalization in particular. The same criticism applies to 
the Economic Freedom of the World. 
A big problem with using the measurements above to study globalization is that they 
are biased toward the economic sides of globalization. In both public debate and academic 
writing, social and political globalization is often overlooked. Some studies include factors 
like Internet use in addition to the traditional economic indicators, but generally, 
‘globalization’ seems to be measured in accordance with what Scholte calls 
internationalization and liberalization. However, a few studies do include measures of 
political and social globalization, and confirm that these factors, too, are statistically 
significant and ought to be taken into account (Tsai, 2007; Nieman, 2011). To analyze the 
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hypotheses derived in the theory section I need to use a measure that captures these sides of 
globalization as well as the economic side, and that provides independent measures for each 
of the three. 
 
3.4.2 Globalization Level 
I employ the 2007 KOF Globalization Index, which has data on a wide range of globalization 
factors such as global flows of goods and finances, state restrictions on trade, cultural 
universialization, Internet use, and tourism (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008). It includes a 
general index as well as a separate variable for economic globalization, one for social 
globalization, and one for political globalization. All four globalization measures in the KOF 
are scales that go from 0–100. The three subcategories consist of several components each, 
which are weighted and added up, and the overall index is in turn composed of the three 
subcategories in the same way. 
 
Overall Globalization  
The index measuring overall globalization level is made up of the measures for economic, 
social, and political globalization. They constitute respectively 36%, 38%, and 26% of the 
index. Weighting of the data is a potential issue because it is necessarily based on a subjective 
assessment of which components are more and which are less important. However, in the case 
of the overall index this is not a big problem, since I also analyze all three components 
separately. 
 
Economic Globalization  
The data on economic globalization is composed of a number of separate measures, grouped 
into the categories ‘actual flows’ and ‘restrictions’. The first includes data on trade, Foreign 
Direct Investment, and portfolio investment, all in percent of GDP (Dreher, Gaston, and 
Martens, 2008: 43). To account for globalization of the labor market in addition to finance 
and goods, it also includes a measure of income payments to foreign nationals. The second 
category measures restrictions on international trade and investments. These include taxes on 
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international trade, mean tariff rate, hidden import barriers, and capital account restrictions.14 
The two categories are each weighted to be 50% of the index of economic globalization. 
 
Social Globalization  
The index of social globalization contains three sets of measures: (1) measures for 
international flow of information, (2) personal contact across borders, and (3) cultural 
proximity. They are weighted as, respectively, 35%, 29%, and 38% of the index. Flow of 
information is proxied by Internet users, Internet hosts, trade in newspapers (again in percent 
of GDP), radios, and cable television (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008: 49). Data on 
personal contact consists of outgoing international telephone traffic and letters, government 
and worker’s transfers, international tourism, as well as foreign population in percent of the 
total population. Level of cultural proximity is indicated by international trade in books, and 
the number of IKEAs and McDonalds’ in a country. 
 
Political Globalization  
This variable is a measure of membership in international organizations, participation in UN 
Security Council missions, and number of embassies in the country. It does not include data 
on regime type. I choose not to include regime type or regime transition as a measure of 
political globalization. It is such a large and distinctive subject that it is more useful to study 
on its own. It would be very difficult to distinguish between any effect of internationalization 
of politics and any separate effect of democratic institutions if democracy was included in the 
measure. Regime type is therefore treated as a control variable in the empirical analysis. 
Again, it must be mentioned that political internationalization is often regional rather than 
global in nature. The KOF measures political globalization in terms states’ inter- or 
supranational engagement, which does not allow for distinction between regional and global 
interaction. 
 
3.4.3 Globalization Process and Shock 
The KOF data indicate the level of globalization for a country in a given year, but I am also 
interested in the effect of the globalization process, i.e. the change in level. I have therefore 
computed variables measuring change as the difference in level of globalization between a 
                                                
14 Some of these measures are borrowed from the above mentioned Economic Freedom of the World 
survey (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008: 43). 
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given year and two years earlier, in percent of the earlier of the two. Additionally, to be able 
to distinguish between change in level and globalization shocks I have computed a dummy 
variable that is coded ‘1’ when the globalization process variable is higher or equal to 15% 
and ‘0’ for any smaller, or negative, change.15 The limit value is set to 15% based on an 
examination of the distribution of the data for all four globalization process variables. The 
mean value of the change variables for overall, economic, and social globalization is about 
3%,16 and I assess a change in level over two years that is five times the mean to be a fairly 
dramatic change. 
 
3.5 Control Variables 
In addition to the globalization variables I include a number of control variables in the 
statistical models. These are more or less standard explanatory variables for civil war, and 
they are included in the analyses of riots as well to make the results comparable. 
 
Democracy and Autocracy 
Regime type is found by many to be statistically related to risk of internal armed conflict, 
with intermediate regimes most at risk (Hegre et al., 2001, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). 
Regime type is therefore included in the analyses, in the form of a set of dummy variables. 
However, the validity of such findings is questionable, because of endogeneity issues (Hegre 
and Sambanis, 2006: 527, Gates et al., 2006, Vreeland, 2008). Like many other studies on the 
subject they employ regime data from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 
2010), but the political participation dimension of the Polity score is defined in part by civil 
war (Vreeland 2008: 402). As a consequence, intermediate regimes are more correlated with 
conflict by definition rather than by causality (Vreeland 2008, Gates et al., 2006: 897-898). 
To try and avoid these problems I use the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) as an indicator of 
regime type (Gates et al., 2006). The SIP is calculated using the same three dimensions as 
                                                
15 The shock variable includes only positive shocks, i.e. rapid increase in level of globalization, not 
negative, i.e. rapid drops in level of globalization. Negative shocks represent deglobalization, not 
globalization. They are therefore not relevant to this the question of whether globalization increases 
conflict. Additionally, there are substantial endogeneity issues with the relationship between internal 
conflict and drops in international interaction. Even when lagging the variables, there is a danger that 
the circumstances in a country leading up to a measurable violent conflict can also cause loss of 
foreign investors, loss of tourism, and so on. 
16 Note that the mean for change in political globalization is around 6.5%, suggesting that shocks of 
political globalization are either more common or less shocking, than for other forms of globalization. 
See the discussion of validity below. 
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Polity (executive recruitment, executive constraints, and political participation), but without 
the problematic elements from Polity IV (ibid.: 897-898).  
I have computed two dummies for regime type: one for democracy and one for 
autocracy. Both dummies are included in the regression models, leaving intermediate regimes 
as the reference category. The Polity IV scale ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy), and the definition of autocracy and democracy is often limited to the outer points 
of the scale, e.g. -10 to -6 for autocracy, and 6 to 10 for democracy. The SIP values range 
from 0–1, and modeling my operationalizations on the standards for Polity IV, I have coded 
observations from 0 to .238 as autocracy and .762 to 1 as democracy. 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
The relationship between ethnicity and internal conflict is debated, and there are several 
different measures available: polarization, fractionalization, political domination, etcetera. I 
employ a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) updated by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) giving the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from 
different ethnolinguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 78). The ELF is calculated from 
data compiled by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s,17 using the Herfindahl 
concentration index, 
     (1) 
where si is the share of group i (i=1,…, n) (Posner 2004: 849, fn.3). 
Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find this variable to have a statistically significant 
relationship with the UCDP/PRIO’s Internal Armed Conflict data, i.e. lower scale civil war, 
making it relevant for my analysis. The variable is updated to 2007. 
 
Population Size 
I control for population size because large populations are statistically more likely to 
experience more internal conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The threshold of 25 battle 
deaths or 100 citizens in a clash is fixed, but the ratio of the threshold to total number of 
citizens changes, of course, with population size. Moreover, large populations are more likely 
to be heterogenous, and thereby have internal divides based on geographical, ethnic, or 
                                                
17 Published in the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964). 
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then applied this finding to Africa, reasoning that, be-
causeAfricancountries are typically ethnicallydiverse, the
strong link between ethnic heterogeneity and slow growth
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religious identity.18 The data material is collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2011). The effect is theoretically likely to be logarithmic 
rather than linear due to the diminishing return of the marginals: the effect of an increase of 
10 000 matters more in a population of a million than one of a billion. A symmetry plot of the 
observations confirms that this is the case, and the variable is therefore log transformed using 
the natural logarithm (ln). 
 
GDP Per Capita 
Even though GDP per capita may be suspected to be somewhat correlated to globalization, 
controlling for poverty/wealth lets me examine what effect global interaction as such may 
have and what is due to economic standings. By the same logic that applies to population size, 
GDP per capita is also log (ln) transformed. These data are also collected from the WDI 
(World Bank, 2011). 
 
GDP Growth 
I control for annual GDP growth in % using WDI data (World Bank, 2011). As with GDP per 
capita, there is some concern that correlation with globalization could pose an issue, a 
possibility it is important to be aware of in robustness checks and the interpretation of the 
results.  
 
Oil 
The data on oil is a dichotomous variable collected from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and 
updated to 2008. Oil wealth is found to be positively related to organized internal conflicts 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). It could be because it says something 
about state capacity and institutional strength. The ‘resource curse’19 thesis describes how 
having high-income natural resources often holds countries back in terms of institutional 
strength and development. A country that has high profits from natural resources (e.g. oil) is 
less dependent on human resources. Less dependency on high tax income gives the 
government less incentive to work for economic development, high primary commodity 
export means less incentive to develop industry. 
                                                
18 Take the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, for example. Before South Sudan became 
independent in 2011, the conflict was internal, but after the divide, it became international. 
19 See e.g. Lujala (2010) 
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Mountainous Terrain 
Like oil, this data is borrowed from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and extrapolated from 1999 to 
2008. It indicates percent of the terrain in a country that is ‘mountainous’. To be able to take 
on more numerous and better equipped government armies, rebels are likely to be helped 
along by favorable geographical conditions like mountains or woodland, where they can fight 
without facing the enemy head-on, and hide when necessary. 
 
Peace Years, Splines, and Year Dummies 
In addition to the ones listed above I include variables for peace years, cubic splines, and year 
dummies in the analyses. For discussions of their function, see the paragraph on regression 
assumptions and other challenges (below). The peace year variables indicate the number of 
years since the last conflict. For civil war, this is done by calculating the years from the last 
year with more than 25 battle related deaths, using the variable for incidence, as opposed to 
onset. 
 
3.6 Reliability and Validity 
Is the data reliable? The Banks data is compiled using newspapers as sources, which may be 
problematic. It relies on there being free press in the countries in question, but in authoritarian 
regimes, conflicts and demonstrations critical of the regime may be underreported. Economic 
data is also often underreported (and not only in authoritarian regimes), which can be seen in 
the many missing observations for economic globalization and data on GDP. I have attempted 
to account for this by examining whether the missing observations are randomly or 
systematically missing (see discussion of regression assumptions and other challenges below). 
The KOF also poses somewhat of a reliability challenge in that it does not always stick to 
reporting data for independent countries. The data for the Soviet Union are reported in the 
form of data for each state, not for the union as a whole. Because of this, the analysis does not 
include any of these countries (including Russia) pre 1990; this region is only included when 
the different states became independent. Missing the Soviet Union in a study of internal 
conflict in the period around 1990 is far from ideal, but on the other hand, it is only one 
country out of 142, and thus not too dramatic. 
What about validity? Do the operationalizations of my variables really measure what I 
want to measure? The variable for civil war onset is dichotomous, and to be able to compare 
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the results I have coded dichotomous variables for the other dependent variables as well. 
Banks’ data originally indicate number of events in a year, while in this study they only 
indicate whether there have been any events or not. This makes the variables less sensitive to 
conflict quantity, but the main focus of my analyses is not primarily the frequency of conflict, 
but rather the type of conflict. I prioritize examining possible differences in the mechanisms 
behind different types of conflict, sacrificing the information of whether something leads to 
multiple conflicts or just one. Additionally, the variable for civil war onset is not sensitive to 
ongoing conflict. It indicates conflict onset, not duration, and not whether any other conflicts 
are already active in the year of onset. This makes me unable to distinguish between what 
leads to long wars and what leads only to short eruptions of violence, but by adding peace 
years to the regression models I compensate partly for this lack of sensitivity. Moreover, the 
globalization process can be expected to not move forward in the event that there is an 
ongoing conflict in a country, it might drop when the conflict starts, and it might jump when 
the conflict is over. This means that there is an issue with endogeneity, but I attempt to 
minimize this problem by lagging the variables, thereby studying globalization’s relationship 
with the risk conflict the following year.  
A possible criticism of the data on social globalization is that it employs number of 
IKEAs and McDonalds’ as indicators of cultural proximity. These are arguably more 
indicators of westernization than of globalization, which needs to be kept in mind in the 
interpretation of the results. Another part of the data on social globalization is number of 
Internet users and hosts, and distribution of cable television. These may be indicators of 
development, rather than of global interaction, which could bias the results. Another potential 
issue of validity is the fact that the globalization scales are relative. Absolute gains in a 
country may not move it up the ranking if other countries have globalized even more (Dreher, 
Gaston, and Martens, 2008). By measuring globalization in this way the KOF Index keeps 
moving the goal posts, which may not be ideal when studying the effect of globalization on 
domestic conditions. Absolute changes in globalization means changes to society, regardless 
of whether the country has globalized more or less than other countries. A further criticism is 
that the KOF index does not distinguish between regional and global interaction; all 
international interaction is seen as globalization. Finally, the way that shock in political 
globalization is coded could be argued to make it less valid than the other shock variables. 
The mean change in political globalization is the double that of the other globalizations, but 
the shock variables are all coded as a 15% or higher increase in level. Bigger changes in 
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globalization level are apparently more common in political than in other areas of society. 
This may either mean that shocks are simply more frequent (which is the assumption behind 
my shock variable) in political globalization, or it may mean that they are not actually shocks 
– that big changes in level of political globalization are not as dramatic as in other areas of 
society, and consequently that I ought to set the limit for shock higher than for the other 
globalizations. I conclude that a 15% change is indeed a 15% change for the country in 
question, regardless of how common it is for other countries, and keep my 15% shock limit. 
 
3.7 Statistical Method 
3.7.1 Logit Regression 
Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, the appropriate statistical method for the 
analyses is logistic or logit regression. I use the latter. With logistic regression the coefficients 
in the results signify the increase in odds, while logit regression is concerned with the logit. 
The logit is the natural logarithm of the odds, making it less intuitively interpretable, but 
giving a linear effect as opposed to a logarithmic one. Although not quite as intuitive as 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, the logit is not impossible to interpret: 
the coefficients indicate the variable’s effect on the logit that a conflict occurs (Hamilton, 
2006: 269). The analyses are carried out in STATA (v. 11.2). 
The logit L is expressed as the natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of Y = 1 (Ringdal 
2001: 409),  
L = ln(P/(1-P))      (2) 
where P is the probability of Y = 1. The logit model for country i in a year t is then 
 ln(Pit/(1-Pit)) = ! + "Xit     (3) 
where ! is the constant, and "X a set of explanatory variables. 
 
3.7.2 Regression Assumptions and Other Challenges 
Regression analysis relies on a number of assumptions being met. First, it assumes that the 
model is specified correctly. This is to say that no important variables omitted, and no 
irrelevant variables are included in the regression model. As for the last point, I have 
described relevance of all the variables in the variable descriptions above. As for omitting 
important variables, there is always the chance that there will be some causal relationship that 
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has not been thought of. But, having included standard variables for civil war studies, I do not 
expect it to be a problem for the regressions on civil war. One might question whether the 
same model is correctly specified for riots, but I think the case against it being so is weaker 
than the importance of having comparable models and comparable results for the different 
dependent variables. 
Second, regression analyses require that the observations are independent of each 
other (Galton’s problem (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 81)). My data fails this requirement: it is 
neither independent spatially nor temporally. However, I control for this as best I can in the 
analyses. To make up for spatial dependence I cluster the observations by country, meaning 
that the analyses account for the fact that e.g. the population size in a country in one year is 
not independent of the population size the previous year. To make up for temporal 
dependence I add peace years and cubic splines to the regression models, as suggested in 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). The logic is that whether there is a conflict in a given year is 
likely to be related to how much time there has been since the last conflict; countries that have 
experienced conflict are statistically more likely to experience it again than countries that 
have not. 
A third assumption is the absence of perfect multicollinearity. After finding some 
correlation20 between a few of the variables that might be troublesome, I ran checks for the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF value is an indication of the severity of 
multicollinearity in the models. They were worryingly high, as exemplified by testing a 
regression model where the control variables and overall globaliaztion level is regressed on 
civil war onset.21 Suggested limit for acceptable VIF value is 10, but for GDP per capita (ln), 
population (ln), and globalization they are 94.19, 48.97, and 42.94, respectively. There is 
clearly an issue with multicollinearity. To try and account for the problem I ran likelihood-
ratio tests, checking whether the variables with multicollinearity were still significant 
additions to the regression models. The likelihood-ratio tests showed that GDP per capita is 
significant for the riot models, but not the civil war models. However, removing it from the 
analyses did not produce dramatic changes in the results, and it is therefore included in both 
because of the value of comparability between the results. Population is a significant addition 
to either models. To conclude, while I have struggled with some multicollinearity in the 
                                                
20 Correlation matrices are presented in appendix E, tables A.14 and A.15. 
21 Model 4 in table 4.1, peace years and splines omitted. See appendix F for table with all VIF values 
from the model. 
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analyses, there is not perfect multicollinearity, and I have taken the measures described above 
to ensure that it is not too problematic. 
Influential outliers are also a potential problem in regression analysis. Extreme values 
can pull the results in one direction. There are a few outliers in my data material, but due to 
the large N, they are not influential to the degree that they are problematic. There are not too 
many or too extreme outliers relative to the amount of observations in total. I have tried to 
solve a potential problem of influential outliers by excluding high-income OECD countries, 
as they are likely to be systematically similar to each other, thus being influential outliers. 
Another possible issue is the randomness of the missing data. Are the missing observations 
systematically missing, or missing completely at random? As noted in the reliability 
discussion, economic data is sometimes lacking, and economic globalization is the biggest 
potential problem in my analyses. There are quite a lot of missing observations in the 
economic globalization variable (781 missing, 4178 observations). This could be a problem, if 
the countries that have missing data on economic globalization have e.g. systematically more 
cases of riots than other countries. To check for this I examined the mean value for riots, civil 
war onset, revolution, and guerrilla warfare. In the cases where economic globalization data is 
missing, the mean for riots is lower, and the mean for the other three types of conflict is 
higher.22 This is a problem and could influence the results, which is important to be aware of 
in the discussion; it could have the consequence that riots seem more likely to be affected by 
economic globalization than is really is, and the opposite for the other forms of conflict. It is, 
however, not an issue with the other three types of globalization, as they have few missing 
observations. Another thing to consider in a study covering nearly four decades is whether 
there are certain years that are especially influential. To control for time trends, i.e. historical 
trends, I add year-dummies to the models. If there are ‘worldwide’ fluctuations for certain 
years, they should be captured by these dummies. Additionally, civil war studies generally 
have a challenge in that the dependent variable is relatively rare, but with over 4000 
observations I assess this to be, although not ideal, a manageable problem. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22Mean for economic globalization missing vs. mean for non-missing: riots: .08 vs. .15, civil war: .07 
vs. .03, revolutions: .29 vs. .15, guerrilla warfare: .23 vs. .13. 
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3.8 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Riots 4734 .144 .351 0 1 
Civil war onset 4737 .039 .193 0 1 
Revolutions 4734 .192 .394 0 1 
Guerrilla warfare 4735 .154 .361 0 1 
Overall globalization, level 4875 40.785 14.422 9.558 88.619 
Economic globalization, level 4178 44.357 17.492 6.969 97.388 
Actual flows 4105 47.082 21.058 2.887 99.005 
Restrictions 3991 42.179 19.563 5.024 95.772 
Social globalization, level 4951 33.146 17.356 2.368 93.744 
Personal contacts 4769 41.120 21.170 3.783 94.391 
Information flows 4913 42.375 21.335 2.505 98.568 
Cultural proximity 4951 16.158 19.480 1 97.242 
Political globalization, level 4951 49.021 19.846 4.274 94.895 
Overall globalization, changea 4617 3.587 6.314 -25.049 42.440 
Economic globalization, changea 3954 3.565 10.509 -52.297 258.231 
Social globalization, changea 4689 3.201 9.726 -37.496 116.850 
Political globalization, changea 4689 6.511 17.760 -44.471 317.600 
Overall globalization, shockb 4617 .062 .240 0 1 
Economic globalization, shockb 3954 .099 .298 0 1 
Social globalization, shockb 4689 .086 .280 0 1 
Political globalization, shockb 4689 .139 .346 0 1 
Democracy 4309 .288 .453 0 1 
Autocracy 4309 .472 .499 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 4485 .453 .281 .004 .925 
Population, totalc 4936 15.666 1.672 11.594 20.999 
GDP per capitac 4290 7.035 1.311 4.057 11.025 
GDP growth, annual (%) 4337 3.907 7.031 -51.031 106.280 
Oil 4959 .170 .375 0 1 
Mountainous terrain 4555 17.721 22.279 0 94.3 
Riots peace years 4734 7.607 8.088 0 37 
Riots cubic spline 1 4734 -277.998 483.808 -2664.027 0 
Riots cubic spline 2 4734 -1023.762 1977.743 -11220.13 0 
Riots cubic spline 3 4734 -1415.346 3143.628 -19032.32 0 
Civil war peace years 4737 10.239 10.293 0 37 
Civil war cubic spline 1 4737 -459.258 661.429 -2628 0 
Civil war cubic spline 2 4737 -2307.170 3741.410 -15312 0 
Civil war cubic spline 3 4737 -2320.263 4284.125 -18810 0 
Revolutions peace years 4734 7,401 8,367 0 37 
Revolutions cubic spline 1 4734 -279,542 504,235 -2664,027 0 
Revolutions cubic spline 2 4734 -1156,551 2350,041 -12864,16 0 
Revolutions cubic spline 3 4734 -1447,974 3376,146 -19824,37 0 
Guerrilla warfare peace years 4735 10,682 10,467 0 37 
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 1 4735 -920,260 1320,380 -5112,051 0 
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 2 4735 -2615,714 4187,318 -16704,24 0 
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 3 4735 -2569,873 4586,861 -19494,5 0 
a % difference from 2 years prior 
b >15% difference from 2 years prior 
c Log transformed 
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4 Analyses and Discussion 
In the first part of this chapter I present the results from the main empirical analyses. It is 
divided into subsections by the four types of globalization. The first subsection contains the 
analyses of how globalization as a whole affects internal conflicts, using the globalization 
index made up of the three subcategories economic, social, and political globalization. Then I 
analyze all three subcategories separately. Each of the four sections includes a set of logit 
regression models that are run on both spontaneous and organized conflict. In the second part 
of the chapter I present briefly the most noteworthy findings from the same regressions run on 
two additional forms of conflict: revolutions and guerrilla warfare. After the results are 
presented, I spend the last part of the chapter discussing what implications the results may 
have, how they relate to each other, and how they relate to the theoretical discussions above. 
 
4.1 Riots and Civil War 
4.1.1 Overall Globalization Level, Change, and Shock 
Table 4.1 displays the results from the regression analyses of overall globalization’s effect on 
spontaneous and organized internal conflict. It is built up as a twin analysis, in which the 
same set of regression models is run on both forms of conflict, thereby testing H2. Models 1, 
3, 5, and 7 have riots as the dependent variable, whereas models 2, 4, 6, and 8 are run on the 
variable for civil war onset. They each have a base model (models 1 and 2), as well as three 
models where I add different operationalizations of globalization to this base. First I test H1a 
and H1b by including globalization level as the independent variable (models 3 and 4). 
Second, I test the validity of H9a in relation to overall globalization by instead including the 
variable for change in percent from two years earlier (models 5 and 6). Finally, to test H9b, 
models 7 and 8 add to the base model a dummy variable that indicates whether there has been 
a shock of globalization, i.e. an increase of 15% or more.  
In the base model for riots, the only variables that produce statistically significant 
coefficients are population size and peace years. A larger population size is related to a 
greater risk of riots, while peace years has a negative relationship with riots. Running the 
same model on civil war onset, ethnic fractionalization and population size are significant at 
the .01 level, and GDP per capita (natural logarithm) and oil are significant at the .10 and .05 
level, respectively. Civil war peace years are also statistically significant at the .10 level. 
Population has a smaller effect on civil war than on riots, though just as statistically  
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significant and in the same direction. Ethnic fractionalization has a quite considerable, 
positive effect on civil war onset. Oil also has a positive effect, though not as big, while an 
increase in GDP per capita is related to a lower risk of civil war. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.018* -0.046***     Overall glob, 
levela   (0.010) (0.015)     
         
    -0.006 -0.004   Overall glob, 
changea     (0.008) (0.017)   
         
      -0.244 0.385 Overall glob, 
shocka       (0.229) (0.293) 
         
Democracya 0.217 0.250 0.230 0.337 0.220 0.337 0.219 0.357 
 (0.158) (0.285) (0.153) (0.299) (0.155) (0.289) (0.155) (0.294) 
         
Autocracya -0.130 -0.206 -0.140 -0.242 -0.097 -0.108 -0.094 -0.096 
 (0.135) (0.289) (0.135) (0.294) (0.138) (0.287) (0.138) (0.289) 
         
0.086 1.230*** 0.130 1.287*** 0.137 1.354*** 0.147 1.354*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.279) (0.380) (0.261) (0.369) (0.277) (0.388) (0.279) (0.393) 
         
0.354*** 0.282*** 0.356*** 0.306*** 0.348*** 0.288*** 0.347*** 0.283*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.046) (0.070) (0.044) (0.068) (0.045) (0.070) (0.044) (0.072) 
         
0.115 -0.228* 0.249** 0.083 0.113 -0.236* 0.114 -0.231* GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.074) (0.119) (0.114) (0.153) (0.074) (0.124) (0.075) (0.125) 
         
-0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.006 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) 
         
Oil -0.183 0.684** -0.222 0.618** -0.183 0.759** -0.181 0.756** 
 (0.178) (0.294) (0.196) (0.291) (0.171) (0.301) (0.171) (0.301) 
         
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.632***  -0.618***  -0.637***  -0.637***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.099)  
         
 0.324*  0.327*  0.317*  0.311* Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.167)  (0.171)  (0.174)  (0.171) 
         
Constant -7.430*** -7.924*** -7.652*** -9.003*** -6.996*** -6.702*** -7.007*** -6.651*** 
 (0.945) (1.682) (0.883) (1.661) (0.901) (1.604) (0.907) (1.610) 
N 3610 3339 3605 3334 3447 3173 3447 3173 
ll -1308.222 -509.800 -1302.260 -504.940 -1241.040 -485.917 -1240.669 -485.207 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year !
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In model 3 and 4 I add the variable for overall globalization level to the base model. It 
has a statistically significant negative effect on risk of riots at the .10 level, as well as a 
negative effect on civil war, which is larger, and significant at the .01 level. H1a is supported 
and H1b, consequently, is not. A high level of globalization is associated with a lower level of 
both spontaneous and organized internal conflict, but it is more strongly linked to organized 
conflict. This confirms the expectation stated in H2 that there is a significant difference 
between the two, but it is not a dramatic difference, as both conflict types are still affected in 
the same direction. 
In models 5 and 6, globalization level is not included; globalization is instead treated 
as a process of change in that level. The change variable is not statistically significant for 
either riots or civil war onset, and both coefficients are close to 0, albeit with different signs. 
Change in overall globalization level does not seem to be related to the likelihood of internal 
conflict (whereas the level appears to be), and H9a is not supported for overall globalization. 
What about H9b? Slow change may be harmless, but are shocks destabilizing? Models 
7 and 8 include the variable for globalization shock. It is not a statistically significant factor 
for either riots or civil war, suggesting that globalization shocks neither increase nor decrease 
the likelihood of internal conflict; H9b is not supported. 
As for the control variables, their coefficients are roughly the same as in the base 
models throughout the analyses. The notable exception is GDP per capita, which changes 
when globalization level is included. In the riot models, it turns from an insignificant variable 
to a statistically significant and positive influence. In the civil war models, it goes from being 
a significant negative influence to being insignificant. In total, then, it moves toward being 
related to higher risk of internal conflict. Why might this be? Overall globalization and GDP 
per capita are quite highly correlated, suggesting that an increase in GDP per capita in itself is 
related to higher risk of conflict. Perhaps this effect is obscured in the base models as well as 
the process models because GDP per capita proxies for level of globalization. Then, when 
globalization level is included as an independent variable, the statistically positive effect of 
GDP per capita is no longer moderated by the pacifying effect of globalization level, which 
seems to reveal two separate effects – one negative, and one positive. It is also interesting to 
note that neither regime type, GDP growth, nor percentage of mountainous terrain are 
statistically significant variables in any of the regression models. 
Globalization is such a wide collection of developments, which calls for a more 
detailed look at its subcategories. Does it matter which part of society is globalized? Can the 
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pacifying effect of globalization level be traced to specific areas of society, and does 
globalizing in different areas of society influence risk of conflict in the same direction? 
Change and shock are not statistically significant using the overall index, but is this the case 
for all subcategories as well? If one has a negative influence and one is positive, they may 
counteract each other’s effect.  
 
4.1.2 Economic Globalization Level, Change, and Shock 
H3a, H3b, and H4 concern globalization of the economy. These hypotheses are tested in the 
logit regression analyses shown in table 4.2, together with the hypotheses that whether it is 
measured as level, change, or shock will affect what relationship globalization has with 
conflict. The results indicate, somewhat surprisingly, that economic globalization is not 
statistically related to internal conflict – neither spontaneous, nor organized, and for none of 
the three alternative ways of operationalizing the phenomenon. 
The control variables stay reasonably stable throughout the models here, too, except 
for GDP per capita. Like in the analysis of overall globalization, adding economic 
globalization level affects the coefficients for GDP per capita. It becomes visible as a positive 
effect on the risk of riots, its influence apparently being strengthened when separated from the 
moderating effect of globalization level, which it correlates somewhat with. However, for 
civil war, the moderation is not as strong. This can be seen as an indication that spontaneous 
and organized conflicts do not work in quite the same way. GDP per capita loses statistical 
significance when either of the alternative economic globalization measures is added, but it 
does not change as dramatically from negative to positive as it did when overall globalization 
level was added in table 4.123. This is likely to be because economic globalization does not 
have a statistically significant effect, and that adding it to the models therefore does not act as 
a control for the effect of GDP per capita, like in the case of overall globalization. Hence, a 
different aspect of globalization must be the suspected ‘moderator’. 
My findings lend no support to the claim that economic globalization as a whole is 
related to risk of internal conflict. Several studies find, however, that factors connected with 
economic globalization are significant predictors of civil war, in the form of trade and FDI 
(Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Hegre, Gissinger, and 
Gleditsch, 2003), but also measured as economic freedom (De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010). Why  
                                                
23 In model 5 (table 4.2), GDP per capita is significant at the .10 level, but its coefficient and standard 
error is nearly the same as in model 1 and 7; it only just tipped over the edge to significance. 
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does the same connection not appear in this study? It could be a result of the different ways 
economic globalization is measured. FDI and trade represent only 50% of the KOF measure 
of economic globalization, together with portfolio investment. The other half is represented 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.010 -0.012     Economic 
glob, levela   (0.006) (0.012)     
         
    0.004 0.010   Economic 
glob, changea     (0.005) (0.013)   
         
      0.017 0.245 Economic 
glob, shocka       (0.179) (0.320) 
         
Democracya 0.217 0.250 0.219 0.279 0.216 0.330 0.219 0.336 
 (0.158) (0.285) (0.155) (0.301) (0.155) (0.302) (0.155) (0.303) 
         
Autocracya -0.130 -0.206 -0.050 -0.267 -0.023 -0.215 -0.023 -0.216 
 (0.135) (0.289) (0.138) (0.327) (0.145) (0.321) (0.145) (0.321) 
         
0.086 1.230*** 0.122 1.188*** 0.128 1.288*** 0.121 1.281*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.279) (0.380) (0.264) (0.369) (0.276) (0.390) (0.276) (0.393) 
         
0.354*** 0.282*** 0.322*** 0.270*** 0.335*** 0.295*** 0.336*** 0.299*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.046) (0.070) (0.049) (0.080) (0.046) (0.081) (0.046) (0.082) 
         
0.115 -0.228* 0.203** -0.140 0.124* -0.234* 0.121 -0.233* GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.074) (0.119) (0.086) (0.159) (0.073) (0.139) (0.074) (0.137) 
         
-0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) 
         
Oil -0.183 0.684** -0.188 0.770** -0.165 0.853*** -0.162 0.862*** 
 (0.178) (0.294) (0.183) (0.309) (0.169) (0.319) (0.169) (0.314) 
         
0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
         
-0.632***  -0.650***  -0.650***  -0.654***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.102)  (0.101)  
         
 0.324*  0.271  0.252  0.255 Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.167)  (0.181)  (0.183)  (0.183) 
         
Constant -7.430*** -7.924*** -7.281*** -7.708*** -6.780*** -6.849*** -6.757*** -6.882*** 
 (0.945) (1.682) (0.954) (1.858) (0.898) (1.856) (0.899) (1.843) 
N 3610 3339 3298 3047 3150 2896 3150 2896 
ll -1308.222 -509.800 -1221.354 -450.261 -1161.954 -427.028 -1162.195 -427.501 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year !
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by restrictions on the economy, e.g. tariffs and taxes.24 There might be a discrepancy between 
the effect of actual flows of goods and finances, and restrictions, causing the results of 
economic globalization to appear insignificant. To test whether this is the case I ran the same 
regression models with the variables for the two sub-measures of globalization as the 
independent variable.25  When measured as change the variables were still insignificant, but 
both as level and shock there were statistically significant coefficients.26 The results 
demonstrate that a higher level of globalization friendly economic policies, i.e. less 
restrictions on international flows, is related to a lower risk of riots, but that when such 
restrictions are loosened in ‘shocks’ there is a considerably higher risk of riots. Having an 
open economy may be pacifying, but opening it up rapidly can spawn spontaneous internal 
conflict. Recall, however, how the mean for riots was lower for missing values of economic 
globalization, meaning that these results are not completely reliable. The cases I have the data 
to test are overall more prone to riots than the ones with missing data. This was the opposite 
for the other conflict forms tested, including civil war. The cases I have tested are less prone 
to civil war than the ones that are missing from the analysis, and this could influence the 
results, e.g. contributing to them being insignificant. 
 
4.1.3 Social Globalization Level, Change, and Shock 
Table 4.3 shows the results from the analyses of social globalization. According to the results 
in model 3 and 4, a high level of social globalization is pacifying, both for spontaneous and 
organized conflict forms. H5b – social globalization decreases the risk of internal conflict – is 
supported, but only if we measure social globalization in level. The process of social 
globalization – both change and shock – is statistically insignificant, and appears to be of no 
relevance to the risk of either form of internal conflict. H9a and b are not supported. The only 
substantial difference in the effect of social globalization is between the different ways of 
operationalizing it, not between the different conflict forms, and H6 is not supported. 
It seems, though, that the results reveal which part of globalization causes the change 
in the coefficients for GDP per capita that we see in table 4.1. When adding the variable for 
                                                
24 De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) use the Economic Freedom of the World index, which focuses on 
policies and restrictions, but it can be criticized for including measures of ‘good governance’ and 
being biased toward neo-liberalism, rather than global integration (as discussed in the variable 
description above). 
25 Tables with the results can be found in appendix B. 
26 Significant at the .05 level. 
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level of social globalization to the riots base model, GDP per capita changes from a 
statistically insignificant effect to a decidedly significant, and positive effect. For civil war, 
GDP per capita changes from being significant and pacifying, to statistically insignificant. As 
described earlier, this is likely to be a result of the high correlation between globalization and  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.028*** -0.038**     Social glob, 
levela   (0.008) (0.018)     
         
    -0.004 0.004   Social glob, 
changea     (0.005) (0.006)   
         
      0.043 -0.128 Social glob, 
shocka       (0.180) (0.308) 
         
Democracya 0.217 0.250 0.227 0.298 0.224 0.338 0.230 0.331 
 (0.158) (0.285) (0.150) (0.298) (0.156) (0.288) (0.155) (0.289) 
         
Autocracya -0.130 -0.206 -0.157 -0.229 -0.095 -0.116 -0.090 -0.118 
 (0.135) (0.289) (0.132) (0.289) (0.137) (0.286) (0.137) (0.288) 
         
0.086 1.230*** 0.036 1.127*** 0.137 1.372*** 0.141 1.371*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.279) (0.380) (0.250) (0.374) (0.277) (0.394) (0.278) (0.393) 
         
0.354*** 0.282*** 0.307*** 0.232*** 0.352*** 0.279*** 0.345*** 0.288*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.046) (0.070) (0.045) (0.082) (0.045) (0.071) (0.045) (0.072) 
         
0.115 -0.228* 0.340*** 0.073 0.116 -0.235* 0.114 -0.233* GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.074) (0.119) (0.101) (0.176) (0.075) (0.125) (0.075) (0.125) 
         
-0.005 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.005 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) 
         
Oil -0.183 0.684** -0.264 0.552* -0.182 0.757** -0.176 0.747** 
 (0.178) (0.294) (0.194) (0.312) (0.171) (0.300) (0.171) (0.301) 
         
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.632***  -0.610***  -0.639***  -0.643***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.099)  
         
 0.324*  0.338**  0.307*  0.309* Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.167)  (0.169)  (0.171)  (0.172) 
         
Constant -7.430*** -7.924*** -7.477*** -8.162*** -7.247*** -8.009*** -7.133*** -8.174*** 
 (0.945) (1.682) (0.918) (1.697) (0.914) (1.705) (0.901) (1.720) 
N 3610 3339 3610 3339 3452 3178 3452 3178 
ll -1308.222 -509.800 -1300.058 -505.525 -1244.367 -486.171 -1244.675 -486.224 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year !
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GDP per capita, a correlation that is highest for the social element of globalization (see 
correlation matrix in appendix E, table A.14). An interpretation of these results could be that 
the conflict reducing effect that seems to come from GDP per capita is better captured by 
level of social globalization, and that when these are controlled for by including globalization 
level, other elements of GDP per capita, that are associated with a higher risk of conflict, are 
shown. However, because of the high correlation, which is an issue in regression analysis, I 
must be cautious about drawing conclusions. The other control variables are stable on 
approximately the same figures as in the base model. 
A high level of social globalization as measured by the KOF index is related to lower 
risk of internal conflicts, but as previously discussed there are some validity issues with this 
part of the index. There are three sub-measures that compose the measure for social 
globalization, and two of these are arguably measures of development and/or westernization, 
rather than globalization. ‘Information flows’ is measured by e.g. Internet, cable TV, and 
radio use, which might be expressions of technological development more than globalization. 
Level of ‘cultural proximity’ is indicated by number of IKEAs and McDonalds restaurants 
(although book trade is also a factor), making biased toward westernized countries. The data 
on personal contacts is less problematic, measured as e.g. number of immigrants and 
international tourism, which are decidedly indicators of international interaction. Although I 
have excluded high-income OECD countries from the analyses, there is a risk that what my 
results are showing is simply that development more generally is associated with less conflict 
proneness. What is more, there is a significant theoretical difference between e.g. the number 
of cable TV users and the number of immigrants in a country, and including them all in the 
same index has limitations in terms of theoretically meaningfulness. I have therefore run the 
same regression models on the sub-measures of social globalization, as I did with economic 
globalization. The models with the shock variables have not produced results that are notably 
different from the results in table 4.3, but both the analyses of level and change have 
interesting results.27  The pacifying effect on riots comes entirely from information flows and 
level of cultural proximity.28 There is no statistically significant effect from personal contacts. 
This supports the suspicion that the lower risk of internal conflict that seems to come from 
social globalization may rather be a result of how it is measured – i.e. in part as development. 
As for civil war, the risk of onset is lower with a higher level of information flows, but neither 
                                                
27 For tables with the results, see appendix B. 
28 Significant at the .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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level of personal contacts, nor cultural proximity is statistically significant. However, an 
increase in level of cultural proximity (i.e. change) is related to lower risk of civil war. 
 
Table 4.4 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Political Globalization Level, Process, and 
Shock 1970-2007 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  0.004 -0.006     Political 
glob, levela   (0.005) (0.007)     
         
    -0.007* -0.007   Political 
glob, changea     (0.004) (0.005)   
         
      -0.315 -0.093 Political 
glob, shocka       (0.194) (0.245) 
         
Democracya 0.217 0.250 0.211 0.256 0.217 0.324 0.219 0.331 
 (0.158) (0.285) (0.160) (0.282) (0.156) (0.288) (0.156) (0.288) 
         
Autocracya -0.130 -0.206 -0.127 -0.235 -0.094 -0.116 -0.100 -0.118 
 (0.135) (0.289) (0.134) (0.290) (0.137) (0.287) (0.137) (0.286) 
         
0.086 1.230*** 0.078 1.252*** 0.142 1.374*** 0.146 1.375*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.279) (0.380) (0.284) (0.381) (0.280) (0.393) (0.281) (0.396) 
         
0.354*** 0.282*** 0.332*** 0.320*** 0.341*** 0.282*** 0.344*** 0.285*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.046) (0.070) (0.057) (0.086) (0.044) (0.072) (0.044) (0.072) 
         
0.115 -0.228* 0.096 -0.206 0.107 -0.237* 0.109 -0.234* GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.074) (0.119) (0.088) (0.127) (0.075) (0.124) (0.075) (0.125) 
         
-0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.005 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) 
         
Oil -0.183 0.684** -0.184 0.688** -0.174 0.754** -0.169 0.752** 
 (0.178) (0.294) (0.174) (0.290) (0.169) (0.302) (0.169) (0.302) 
         
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.632***  -0.635***  -0.629***  -0.635***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.100)  
         
 0.324*  0.317*  0.321*  0.313* Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.167)  (0.167)  (0.174)  (0.173) 
         
Constant -7.430*** -7.924*** -6.808*** -8.437*** -6.949*** -8.012*** -7.037*** -8.117*** 
 (0.945) (1.682) (1.035) (1.849) (0.911) (1.734) (0.906) (1.728) 
N 3610 3339 3610 3339 3452 3178 3452 3178 
ll -1308.222 -509.800 -1307.717 -509.457 -1242.656 -485.650 -1243.058 -486.242 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year !
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4.1.4 Political Globalization Level, Change, and Shock 
Lastly, I analyze the political side of globalization (table 4.4). Models 3 and 4 in table are 
regressions with level of political globalization as the main independent variable, 5 and 6 
include instead change in level of globalization, and 7 and 8 test for the effect of political 
globalization shocks. Level does not matter for either forms of conflict, and neither does 
shock. The change variable has a tiny, negative relationship with the risk of riots, but that is 
all that political globalization seems to have to do with risk of internal conflict. This 
relationship is only significant at the .10 level, and the coefficient is just -0.007. It is weak, 
but some, support for H7a and H9a. The difference between the effect of change in political 
globalization on riots and civil war onset is so small that I would be reluctant to take it as 
confirmation of H8, although the former is statistically significant and the latter is not. Here, 
too, the control variables stay stable throughout the analyses; the GDP per capita coefficient 
that has been an issue in the analyses of the other forms of globalization level is only slightly 
affected by the inclusion of political globalization level in models 3 and 4. 
 
4.2 Alternative Analyses 
4.2.1 Including High-Income OECD Countries 
The analyses above are carried out on the sample described in the research design chapter; 
high-income OECD countries are excluded. High-income OECD countries are more relevant 
to the study of globalization level than of the globalization process, making them potentially 
biasing for this study. They are likely to have systematic similarities and thereby be a group 
of influential outliers. But does excluding them make a difference in the results? Is it 
necessary for future research to take this divide into account? To check the general validity of 
the hypotheses regardless of income level I have conducted the same analyses as the ones 
described above on the full data set.29 Tables with the results from these regressions can be 
found in appendix C. The results are not dramatically different. The effects appear somewhat 
stronger, both in terms of size of the coefficients and statistical significance, but the general 
picture of the relationship between globalization and conflict is the same. 
 
                                                
29 That is, the analysis of overall, economic, social, and political globalization, not the detailed 
analyses of economic and social globalization. 
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4.2.2 Other Forms of Internal Conflict 
The outer points of the spontaneous–organized scale are not the only types of internal 
conflict. Many are somewhere in between. To achieve a broader perspective on the 
relationship between internal conflict and globalization I have run the same models as the 
ones described in the paragraphs above on two additional forms of internal conflict: 
revolutions and guerrilla warfare. The results from the analyses of all four forms of conflict 
are summed up in table 4.5 below, showing only the statistically significant coefficients.30 
The direction of the other coefficients are indicated by + or –.  
Revolutions are affected similarly to riots by overall globalization. However, when the 
index is separated into the three smaller variables, globalization does not appear as a 
significant effect. Guerrilla warfare is characterized by having a relatively high level of 
organization, and might be expected to behave in a similar way to civil war. This is not 
particularly evident in the results, although a few similarities can be seen. Guerrilla warfare, 
too, is affected negatively by level of social globalization, but only with half the strength 
relative to civil war. Guerrilla warfare has a quite strong, statistically significant relationship 
 
Table 4.5 Statistically Significant Coefficients: Globalization and Four Types of Internal 
Conflict 1970-2007 
 
                                                
30 See appendix D for variable descriptions and full tables. 
 
!
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
High-income OECD countries excluded 
+ and – indicates direction of the coefficients that are not statistically significant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 Riots Civil War Revolutions Guerrilla War 
Overall Globalization     
Level -0.018* -0.046*** -0.016* – 
Change – – – + 
Shock – + – – 
Economic Globalization     
Level – – – – 
Change + + – + 
Shock + + – 0.524** 
Social Globalization     
Level -0.028** -0.038** – -0.018* 
Change – + – – 
Shock + – – + 
Political Globalization     
Level + – – + 
Change -0.007* – – – 
Shock – – – – 
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with shocks of economic globalization, and is thus the only form of conflict to be 
significantly affected by the full index of economic globalization. The relationship is positive, 
meaning that a rapid increase in a country’s level of economic globalization increases the risk 
of guerrilla warfare.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
I have described the results from the empirical analysis above, but in this section I assess and 
discuss further what implications they have for the expectations in the initial theoretical 
discussion. Are the hypotheses valid or not, and if not, why is this? Can any of them be safely 
confirmed or rejected? I address these questions in three subsections below, each with its own 
focus. The first is centered around the difference between globalization of the three separate 
areas of society. In the second section I discuss what the results say about the difference 
between spontaneous and organized conflict, and the third is concentrated on the variation in 
results owing to the different ways of operationalizing globalization. 
 
4.3.1 Different globalizations 
I have found some support in the empirical analysis for H1a. Having a high level of overall 
globalization has a pacifying influence on internal conflict in general, i.e., it decreases the risk 
of violent riots and civil war. But, ‘globalization’ covers a broad spectrum of developments, 
and some of these may affect risk of internal conflicts; others may not. Some may increase the 
risk, some may decrease it, and opposing effects may balance each other out.  
The empirical analyses confirm that there is indeed a difference between economic 
globalization, social globalization, and political globalization in terms of their relationship 
with several types of internal conflict. At first glance, only the social/cultural branch of 
globalization seems to have a strong statistical relationship with internal conflict, while 
economic and political forms of globalization are both close to inconsequential. However, 
when studying individually the components that make up the index of economic globalization 
I find that the component that concerns policies matter, while the actual international flows of 
goods and finances is not a statistically significant predictor of internal conflicts. 
A lower level of restrictions on the economy is linked with a lower risk of spontaneous 
conflict. Riots seem to occur less in countries with more globalization friendly economic 
policies than in more economically protectionist countries. This result supports H3b. 
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However, although the long-term effect may be pacifying, shock treatments of economically 
globalizing policies – rapid removal of restrictions – is not a good way of avoiding riots. 
Decreasing restrictions in shocks seems to increase the risk of riots quite considerably. This is 
in line with the expectation of globalization’s critics that economic globalization affects 
people negatively, by increasing inequality both globally and nationally, causing insecurity 
for workers, etcetera. If economic globalization has such consequences, it should be expected 
to increase individual motivation for conflict, and therefore be particularly important to the 
risk of riots, and this is just what the results of the empirical analyses are indicating. And so, I 
find support for both H3a and H3b, but on different conditions. 
Although it works the other way than economic globalization, social globalization is 
perhaps a significant influence on risk of internal conflict because it, too, affects large parts of 
the population directly. But although it appears as a pacifying factor, there are some issues to 
consider before taking this as confirmation of H5b. When divided into its three components, 
there is a distinct difference between their individual effects. Increase in cultural proximity is 
related to lower risk of civil war, and a high level is associated with less riots. However, the 
cultural proximity variable is somewhat questionable as it relies on counting the number of 
IKEAs and McDonalds’ in a country (although book trade is also a factor), and could be a 
proxy for capitalism or westernization rather than global integration. Still, the theory is that 
they represent a certain common cultural base. We eat the same food and sit on the same 
chairs. We have a common culture of eating fast food and buying cheap furniture, 
representing not only American and Swedish culture, but commercial culture more generally. 
Whether this commercialism is an expression of westernization or globalization is debatable. 
As for information flows, it is connected with lower risk of spontaneous and internal conflict. 
A high level of information flows means high use of international newspapers, Internet, and 
other media and information technology. Integration across borders is perhaps in that way felt 
inside the borders through promotion of knowledge and tolerance of other cultures and 
identities, and generally a broader perspective. But note that it could partly be a spurious 
relationship. There may be factors that are not part of social globalization as such, but that are 
related, causing the pacifying effect we see in the results. Both cultural proximity and 
information flow might represent development rather than globalization. For instance, cable 
TV use and consumption of international media suggests that there is a certain level of wealth 
and resources available to people, which is likely to be associated with a peaceful society. As 
we have seen, level of social globalization is correlated with GDP per capita and appears to 
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capture some of its pacifying effects. The part of the index of social globalization that 
measures personal contacts across borders is not a statistically significant effect. This element 
includes e.g. international tourism to the country and number of immigrants in a country, and 
it is not as likely to be a proxy for development, capitalism, etcetera as cultural proximity and 
information flows. Its statistical insignificance suggests that it might not be the increase of 
global interaction in itself that leads to a lower risk of internal conflict, but that there is 
something to the suspicion that the relationship is in fact a spurious one. 
Political globalization has a minor relationship with lower risk of riots, but the results 
are just barely statistically significant and the coefficient is small. Why? Perhaps international 
political integration is a factor that does not affect people’s daily lives directly or 
dramatically. Whatever goes on in the political elite circles is not necessarily felt acutely in 
the general population and, apparently, does not create either sparks or harmony. Still, it is 
surprising that neither the level nor the process of political globalization act as a proxy for 
other developments in a country that could be related to the likelihood of internal conflict. As 
mentioned in the theory, one might expect politically globalized countries to be more stable, 
more adhering to human rights, etcetera, thereby reducing conflict risk, but no such effect 
turns up in my results, and I cannot confirm nor discard either H7a or H7b. 
There are, however, some quite interesting findings in how the control variables are 
affected by the addition of different globalization forms to the regression models. Oil does not 
matter to risk of civil war when level of social globalization is added to the analysis. As 
described above, in theories of civil war, oil is expected to be a contributing factor because of 
either its consequences for a country’s economic development – having high-value natural 
resources reduces the incentive to develop other industry and an economy based on human 
resources – or because it is a proxy for the strength of the government. In my analyses, oil is a 
significant explanatory factor for civil war even when economic and political globalization 
are added to the models, but when level of social globalization is included in the explanatory 
model, the effect of oil is obscured. What is it about social globalization that suddenly 
explains what oil used to explain? Perhaps level of social globalization says something about 
the social capital in a society, not just economic capital, and the stability of the social 
institutions, not just state institutions. Perhaps, when such factors, or the lack of them, are 
captured by another variable, the importance of oil as an explanatory factor is diminished.  
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4.3.2 Different conflicts 
Does globalization affect spontaneous and organized internal conflicts in different ways? The 
most notable finding showing a difference between the two is the difference in the way they 
are affected by economic restrictions. Less economic restrictions is pacifying in terms of riots, 
but has no statistically significant effect on civil war, and reducing restrictions in shocks 
increases the likelihood of riots, but has no detectable effect on civil war. As mentioned, this 
can be interpreted as support for the argument that economic globalization increases the 
motivation for internal conflict, by increasing grievances of various kinds. Organized conflict 
is more binding to be a part of; it requires different conditions in order to grow, like state 
weakness. Spontaneous conflict requires individual motivation, and according to the results in 
this study, shocks of economically globalizing policies increases such motivation, but has no 
statistically significant effect on the feasibility of organized conflicts. 
Apart from in the analysis of social globalization level, oil consistently appears as a 
statistically significant positive factor in explaining civil war, and is consistently insignificant 
to riots. This shows that there is a difference between spontaneous and organized internal 
conflicts. Organized conflicts appear to be more feasible in countries that have oil, whether 
because of lower state capacity or economic explanations, but riots do not require the same 
conditions to be feasible. 
 
4.3.3 Different operationalizations of globalization  
According to the discussions leading up to H9a and H9b, we ought to expect a high level of 
globalization in a country to be a different influence on a society than the process of 
globalizing. The theory was that highly globalized societies generally possess a certain 
institutional strength that less globalized countries do not, but that any process of change in a 
society is destabilizing and contributes to a higher risk of war. The balance between these two 
– the strength gained by a higher level and the weakness of being in transformation – should 
help determine the likelihood of conflict in a society. To complicate the matter, there are 
many potential threats associated with a high level of globalization that may outweigh the 
expected pacifying effect of institutional strength. 
The results from the analyses generally support the expectation that the higher the 
level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict. However, this effect 
  68 
seems to come solely from the elements categorized as social globalization; neither a high 
level of economic, nor political globalization, seems to matter to the risk of internal conflict.  
Change in level of globalization in a country does not influence the risk of internal 
conflict except for in the detailed analysis of social globalization, where increase in cultural 
proximity appeared to be pacifying. Still, in general the coefficients are invariably low, 
although it just about tips over to the lowest level of significance in the case of political 
globalization. I cannot find any support for H9a, the results instead suggest that the opposite 
is more accurate: that the globalization process is pacifying, if anything. An explanation for 
this could be that the change that the variable captures in most cases happens at a slow pace, 
not upsetting society. 
Shocks of globalization, on the other hand, should be expected to be more dangerous 
events. According to the results, this is the case with economic globalization measured as 
policy restrictions, lending some support to H9b. Globalization shock is not a significant 
predictor of internal conflict in any other form. This might be due to the way the variable is 
calculated. It is arguable whether the limit for what is a shock is set high enough. It may be 
that a 20% change instead of a 15% is destabilizing 
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5 Conclusion 
I have conducted a broad empirical analysis of the relationship between globalization and 
internal conflict, dividing globalization into economic, social, and political globalization, and 
distinguishing between spontaneous and organized forms of violent internal conflict. The 
results indicate that the factors that go under social globalization are the strongest influences 
on the likelihood of internal conflict. It is, however, questionable whether its apparently 
pacifying effect is a result of global social interactions as such, or a result of a spurious 
relationship with development and social or economic resources as an underlying variable. 
Some elements of the data on social globalization employed in this study can be criticized for 
being indicators of development instead of globalization, and the element that is less likely to 
be subject to such criticism did not produce statistically significant results. Economic and 
political globalization appears to have very little effect on the risk of either spontaneous 
internal conflict (represented by riots) or organized conflict (represented by civil war onset), 
but when separating the measure of economic globalization into its two subcomponents actual 
flows and economic restrictions, the latter turns out to be a significant predictor of riots. In the 
long term, a high level (i.e. little restrictions) is related to a slightly lower risk of riots, but 
rapid drops in economic restrictions can apparently increase frustrations and cause riots. This 
indicates that there is a significant difference in the way globalization affects spontaneous and 
organized conflicts, and thus that it is meaningful to study in the future not only globalization 
and civil war, but globalization and riots, too. 
Further, the study demonstrates that whether globalization is treated as a static 
condition or a process of change matters significantly to which result one will get when 
studying it. This distinction is very useful to be aware of in future research and when 
comparing the results from different studies of globalization. The level of globalization is the 
most influential factor, and while the change in that level was expected to be destabilizing and 
increase conflict risk, it seems to be of little importance. While many aspects of the process of 
globalization appear not to affect internal conflict, there are notable exceptions. Increasing 
cultural proximity is pacifying and that shocks of economically globalizing policies spawn 
riots. 
One cannot control for everything, and there are a few weaknesses to this study that 
should be commented on. First, the framework of this analysis does not allow for the 
distinction between globalization and regionalization (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 61). A 
country may have very high levels of interaction with their neighboring countries, but very 
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little with other parts of the world. Is that really ‘globalization’? It is an important difference 
in its own right, but I have not controlled for it in this study, as it would add to the complexity 
level and obscure the results more than it would be useful. Any interaction with foreign actors 
is counted as globalization, regardless of geographical proximity.  
Second, the negative effect that economic globalization may have through globalizing 
economic crises is not represented well by this type of quantitative study, even less so 
because of my adding year dummies to the analyses.  
Third, the scope of the thesis does not allow for both broad and in-depth studies. 
Studying several forms of globalization and several forms of internal conflict is no doubt a 
broad subject, and consequently an in-depth analysis of the different effects of each of the 
many factors that make up the overall picture is not realistic, although I have attempted to 
look into details of both social and economic globalization when possible and desirable. Still, 
studying the overall picture hopefully contributes to the fields of conflict studies and 
globalization studies by giving an idea of which parts of the picture are most interesting for 
further research, and which distinctions should be paid particular attention to, e.g. the 
difference between economic policies and economic flows. Additionally, being aware of 
which forms of globalization affect which forms of internal conflicts is useful for policy 
makers in the process of developing preventive measures and developing policies steering 
society toward the developments that are associated with less conflict. My findings suggest 
that quick loosening of economic restrictions is not desirable, which has implications for how 
wise the adoption of an economic policy reform package in line with the Washington 
Consensus should be expected to be. On a different note, my findings suggest that promoting 
social and cultural globalization could help prevent both spontaneous and organized internal 
conflict, but that one should be aware that aiming for general development might be the more 
effective way to go. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. List of High-Income OECD Countries Excluded From 
Main Analyses 
United States 
Canada 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
France 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Portugal 
Germany/West Germany (post/pre 1990) 
Austria 
Italy 
Greece 
Finland 
Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Iceland 
Japan 
Australia 
New Zealand 
 
(23 countries in total) 
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Appendix B. Sub-Measures of Economic and Social Globalization 
Table A.1 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Economic Globalization 
Level 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Riots Riots Riots Civil war Civil war Civil war 
-0.010   -0.012   Economic 
glob, levela (0.006)   (0.012)   
       
 -0.001   -0.005  Actual flows, 
levela  (0.004)   (0.007)  
       
  -0.013**   -0.010 Restrictions, 
levela   (0.006)   (0.011) 
       
Democracya 0.219 0.199 0.228 0.279 0.150 0.224 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.160) (0.301) (0.303) (0.298) 
       
Autocracya -0.050 -0.098 -0.048 -0.267 -0.221 -0.266 
 (0.138) (0.144) (0.136) (0.327) (0.316) (0.324) 
       
0.122 0.081 0.113 1.188*** 1.293*** 1.098*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.264) (0.274) (0.274) (0.369) (0.396) (0.369) 
       
0.322*** 0.338*** 0.329*** 0.270*** 0.268*** 0.285*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.049) (0.053) (0.044) (0.080) (0.084) (0.079) 
       
0.203** 0.126 0.247*** -0.140 -0.158 -0.141 GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.086) (0.085) (0.078) (0.159) (0.139) (0.163) 
       
-0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.007 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
       
Oil -0.188 -0.197 -0.233 0.770** 0.646** 0.718** 
 (0.183) (0.185) (0.169) (0.309) (0.300) (0.308) 
       
Mountainous 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
-0.650*** -0.655*** -0.637***    Riot peace 
yrs (0.103) (0.101) (0.103)    
       
   0.271 0.259 0.260 Civil war 
peace yrs    (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) 
       
Constant -7.281*** -6.887*** -7.132*** -7.708*** -7.801*** -6.699*** 
 (0.954) (0.947) (0.895) (1.858) (1.872) (1.834) 
N 3298 3237 3159 3047 2993 2928 
ll -1221.354 -1221.744 -1193.782 -450.261 -447.294 -445.604 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.2 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Economic Globalization 
Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Riots Riots Riots Civil war Civil war Civil war 
0.017   0.245   Economic 
glob, shocka (0.179)   (0.320)   
       
 0.246   0.791  Actual 
flows, shocka  (0.322)   (0.485)  
       
  1.024**   -0.059 Restrictions, 
shocka   (0.460)   (1.068) 
       
Democracya 0.219 0.207 0.232 0.336 0.364 0.451 
 (0.155) (0.160) (0.157) (0.303) (0.301) (0.302) 
       
Autocracya -0.023 -0.036 -0.008 -0.216 0.022 -0.071 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) (0.321) (0.307) (0.319) 
       
0.121 0.139 0.133 1.281*** 1.457*** 1.291*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.276) (0.277) (0.279) (0.393) (0.430) (0.406) 
       
0.336*** 0.335*** 0.326*** 0.299*** 0.306*** 0.303*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) 
       
0.121 0.118 0.122 -0.233* -0.184 -0.244* GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (0.137) (0.139) (0.144) 
       
-0.004 -0.009 -0.008 0.003 0.022* 0.017 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) 
       
Oil -0.162 -0.206 -0.148 0.862*** 0.669** 0.858*** 
 (0.169) (0.175) (0.172) (0.314) (0.319) (0.317) 
       
Mountainous 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
       
-0.654*** -0.657*** -0.642***    Riot peace 
yrs (0.101) (0.100) (0.103)    
       
   0.255 0.278 0.268 Civil war 
peace yrs    (0.183) (0.182) (0.180) 
       
Constant -6.757*** -6.883*** -6.821*** -6.882*** -8.908*** -7.094*** 
 (0.899) (0.912) (0.882) (1.843) (1.938) (1.892) 
N 3150 3076 3000 2896 2829 2766 
ll -1162.195 -1157.366 -1127.711 -427.501 -412.536 -412.673 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.3 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Social Globalization Level 
1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Riots Riots Riots Civil war Civil war Civil war Civil war 
-0.028***    -0.038**    Social glob, 
levela (0.008)    (0.018)    
         
 -0.004    -0.011   Personal 
contact, levela  (0.007)    (0.011)   
         
  -0.013**    -0.028**  Information 
flows, levela   (0.005)    (0.011)  
         
   -0.014***    -0.010 Cultural 
proximity, 
levela 
   (0.004)    (0.008) 
         
Democracya 0.227 0.210 0.245 0.232 0.298 0.176 0.326 0.277 
 (0.150) (0.162) (0.158) (0.154) (0.298) (0.288) (0.292) (0.294) 
         
Autocracya -0.157 -0.144 -0.118 -0.134 -0.229 -0.293 -0.147 -0.201 
 (0.132) (0.141) (0.138) (0.132) (0.289) (0.305) (0.294) (0.291) 
         
0.036 0.169 0.017 0.054 1.127*** 1.213*** 1.083*** 1.194*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.250) (0.280) (0.265) (0.257) (0.374) (0.379) (0.387) (0.375) 
         
0.307*** 0.341*** 0.332*** 0.376*** 0.232*** 0.265*** 0.245*** 0.294*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.045) (0.061) (0.046) (0.043) (0.082) (0.094) (0.077) (0.069) 
         
0.340*** 0.168* 0.231** 0.212*** 0.073 -0.123 0.033 -0.163 GDP p.c. (ln)a 
(0.101) (0.087) (0.097) (0.077) (0.176) (0.128) (0.157) (0.126) 
         
-0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
         
Oil -0.264 -0.197 -0.194 -0.283 0.552* 0.611** 0.677** 0.608** 
 (0.194) (0.183) (0.186) (0.188) (0.312) (0.294) (0.293) (0.309) 
         
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
-0.610*** -0.648*** -0.634*** -0.610***     Riot peace yrs 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.102)     
         
    0.338** 0.350** 0.378** 0.319* Civil war 
peace yrs     (0.169) (0.169) (0.172) (0.167) 
         
Constant -7.477*** -7.257*** -7.144*** -8.339*** -8.162*** -6.328*** -8.317*** -8.440*** 
 (0.918) (1.105) (0.885) (0.973) (1.697) (1.889) (1.694) (1.729) 
N 3610 3535 3587 3610 3339 3270 3319 3339 
ll -1300.058 -1273.808 -1294.791 -1301.191 -505.525 -482.997 -498.015 -509.020 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year !
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Table A.4 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Social Globalization 
Change 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Riots Riots Riots Civil war Civil war Civil war Civil war 
-0.004    0.004    Social glob, 
changea (0.005)    (0.006)    
         
 -0.035    -0.003   Personal contact, 
changea  (0.026)    (0.032)   
         
  0.003    0.010  Information 
flows, changea   (0.015)    (0.028)  
         
   -0.009    -0.022** Cultural 
proximity,changea    (0.009)    (0.010) 
         
Democracya 0.224 0.231 0.235 0.223 0.338 0.394 0.492* 0.463 
 (0.156) (0.160) (0.156) (0.156) (0.288) (0.283) (0.285) (0.284) 
         
Autocracya -0.095 -0.091 -0.069 -0.090 -0.116 -0.069 0.039 -0.004 
 (0.137) (0.141) (0.136) (0.138) (0.286) (0.298) (0.285) (0.284) 
         
0.137 0.202 0.162 0.139 1.372*** 1.393*** 1.445*** 1.413*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.277) (0.284) (0.278) (0.275) (0.394) (0.406) (0.412) (0.404) 
         
0.352*** 0.355*** 0.345*** 0.349*** 0.279*** 0.326*** 0.299*** 0.309*** Population, total 
(ln)a (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.071) (0.075) (0.072) (0.070) 
         
0.116 0.137* 0.117 0.122 -0.235* -0.215 -0.222* -0.219* GDP p.c. (ln)a 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.125) (0.133) (0.129) (0.128) 
         
-0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 0.005 0.021 0.019 0.017 GDP growth (%)a 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
         
Oil -0.182 -0.182 -0.180 -0.180 0.757** 0.700** 0.732** 0.718** 
 (0.171) (0.176) (0.171) (0.173) (0.300) (0.318) (0.310) (0.310) 
         
Mountainous 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
         
-0.639*** -0.653*** -0.647*** -0.637***     Riot peace yrs 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)     
         
    0.307* 0.355** 0.374** 0.357** Civil war peace 
yrs     (0.171) (0.171) (0.177) (0.174) 
         
Constant -7.247*** -7.464*** -7.013*** -7.090*** -8.009*** -9.105*** -8.763*** -7.364*** 
 (0.914) (0.912) (0.907) (0.930) (1.705) (1.807) (1.725) (1.604) 
N 3452 3361 3411 3432 3178 3093 3140 3158 
ll -1244.367 -1202.077 -1228.492 -1235.857 -486.171 -446.323 -464.954 -471.324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown  
High-income OECD countries excluded 
aLagged one year 
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Appendix C. Riots and Civil War, All Countries 
Table A.5 Descriptive Statistics, All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Riots 5608 .141 .348 0 1 
Civil war onset 5611 .034 .180 0 1 
Overall globalization, level 5749 45.580 18.118 9.558 92.893 
Economic globalization, level 5052 48.710 19.611 6.969 98.688 
Social globalization, level 5825 38.41 21.249 2.368 94.575 
Political globalization, level 5825 54.015 22.465 4.274 98.781 
Overall globalization, changea 5445 3.376 5.981 -25.049 42.440 
Economic globalization, changea 4782 3.367 9.679 -52.297 258.231 
Social globalization, changea 5517 3.193 9.363 -37.497 116.850 
Political globalization, changea 5517 5.739 16.703 -44.471 317.600 
Overall globalization, shockb 5445 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Economic globalization, shockb 4782 0.073 0.259 0 1 
Social globalization, shockb 5517 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Political globalization, shockb 5517 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Democracy 5177 .405 .491 0 1 
Autocracy 5177 .396 .489 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 5245 .421 .283 .004 .925 
Population, totalc 5810 15.761 1.680 11.594 20.999 
GDP per capitac 5147 7.498 1.592 4.057 11.025 
GDP growth, annual (%) 5190 3.761 6.507 -51.031 106.280 
Oil 5833 .151 .358 0 1 
Mountainous terrain 5353 17.367 21.737 0 94.3 
Riot peace years 5608 7.915 8.433 0 37 
Riot cubic spline 1 5608 -299.803 515.838 -2664.027 0 
Riot cubic spline 2 5608 -1114.808 2116.477 -11220.13 0 
Riot cubic spline 3 5608 -1564.383 3386.688 -19032.32 0 
Civil war peace years 5611 11.276 10.751 0 37 
Civil war cubic spline 1 5611 -525.433 707.811 -2628 0 
Civil war cubic spline 2 5611 -2676.687 4028.777 -15312 0 
Civil war cubic spline 3 5611 -2733.068 4653.880 -18810 0 
a % difference from 2 years prior 
b >15% increase from 2 years prior 
c Log transformed 
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Logit regression 
Table A.6 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Overall Globalization Level, Process, and 
Shock 1970-2007, All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.025** -0.046***     Overall glob, 
levela   (0.010) (0.014)     
         
    -0.009 -0.003   Overall glob, 
changea     (0.008) (0.017)   
         
      -0.285 0.374 Overall glob, 
shocka       (0.220) (0.291) 
         
Democracya 0.090 0.234 0.148 0.343 0.104 0.329 0.104 0.348 
 (0.165) (0.295) (0.159) (0.302) (0.164) (0.301) (0.164) (0.306) 
         
Autocracya -0.154 -0.210 -0.150 -0.229 -0.126 -0.101 -0.121 -0.089 
 (0.131) (0.288) (0.131) (0.292) (0.134) (0.287) (0.134) (0.289) 
         
-0.062 1.230*** 0.070 1.347*** -0.019 1.353*** -0.005 1.356*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.277) (0.375) (0.256) (0.363) (0.273) (0.383) (0.274) (0.388) 
         
0.324*** 0.287*** 0.327*** 0.311*** 0.316*** 0.288*** 0.314*** 0.285*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.050) (0.068) (0.049) (0.065) (0.048) (0.069) (0.048) (0.071) 
         
-0.052 -0.305*** 0.173 0.053 -0.059 -0.318*** -0.056 -0.313*** GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.058) (0.095) (0.125) (0.142) (0.058) (0.097) (0.059) (0.098) 
         
-0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.007 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) 
         
Oil -0.064 0.760*** -0.140 0.649** -0.054 0.847*** -0.052 0.843*** 
 (0.171) (0.282) (0.192) (0.275) (0.165) (0.288) (0.165) (0.287) 
         
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.679***  -0.654***  -0.662***  -0.662***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.102)  (0.099)  (0.101)  (0.101)  
         
 0.389**  0.403**  0.382**  0.378** Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.174)  (0.179)  (0.181)  (0.179) 
         
Constant -5.662*** -7.734*** -6.500*** -9.171*** -5.573*** -7.887*** -5.599*** -7.877*** 
 (0.941) (1.584) (1.066) (1.578) (0.894) (1.615) (0.893) (1.616) 
N 4324 4107 4319 4102 4126 3906 4126 3906 
ll -1547.277 -538.702 -1536.239 -532.901 -1464.136 -510.473 -1463.922 -509.782 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.7 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Economic Globalization Level, Process, and 
Shock 1970-2007, All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.010 -0.013     Economic 
glob, levela   (0.006) (0.011)     
         
    0.003 0.010   Economic 
glob, changea     (0.005) (0.013)   
         
      0.008 0.237 Economic 
glob, shocka       (0.175) (0.319) 
         
Democracya 0.090 0.234 0.110 0.273 0.109 0.322 0.111 0.329 
 (0.165) (0.295) (0.163) (0.311) (0.165) (0.314) (0.165) (0.313) 
         
Autocracya -0.154 -0.210 -0.074 -0.271 -0.056 -0.219 -0.057 -0.221 
 (0.131) (0.288) (0.135) (0.325) (0.141) (0.318) (0.141) (0.318) 
         
-0.062 1.230*** 0.011 1.207*** 0.003 1.291*** -0.004 1.282*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.277) (0.375) (0.268) (0.363) (0.276) (0.385) (0.276) (0.388) 
         
0.324*** 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.272*** 0.302*** 0.295*** 0.303*** 0.299*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.050) (0.068) (0.053) (0.077) (0.049) (0.079) (0.050) (0.079) 
         
-0.052 -0.305*** 0.038 -0.207 -0.049 -0.324*** -0.052 -0.324*** GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.058) (0.095) (0.084) (0.135) (0.058) (0.104) (0.059) (0.103) 
         
-0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) 
         
Oil -0.064 0.760*** -0.084 0.836*** -0.051 0.940*** -0.048 0.949*** 
 (0.171) (0.282) (0.176) (0.291) (0.169) (0.302) (0.169) (0.298) 
         
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
         
-0.679***  -0.695***  -0.676***  -0.680***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.102)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.103)  
         
 0.389**  0.356*  0.337*  0.338* Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.174)  (0.193)  (0.195)  (0.195) 
         
Constant -5.662*** -7.734*** -5.183*** -6.121*** -5.425*** -7.748*** -5.413*** -7.805*** 
 (0.941) (1.584) (0.960) (1.560) (0.892) (1.799) (0.889) (1.790) 
N 4324 4107 4012 3808 3829 3622 3829 3622 
ll -1547.277 -538.702 -1459.136 -478.661 -1384.418 -451.333 -1384.642 -451.835 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.8 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Social Globalization Level, Process, and 
Shock 1970-2007, All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.029*** -0.033**     Social glob, 
levela   (0.008) (0.014)     
         
    -0.005 0.003   Social glob, 
changea     (0.005) (0.006)   
         
      -0.046 -0.205 Social glob, 
shocka       (0.161) (0.305) 
         
Democracya 0.090 0.234 0.146 0.295 0.108 0.328 0.112 0.319 
 (0.165) (0.295) (0.157) (0.302) (0.165) (0.300) (0.164) (0.300) 
         
Autocracya -0.154 -0.210 -0.146 -0.210 -0.126 -0.110 -0.119 -0.115 
 (0.131) (0.288) (0.129) (0.289) (0.133) (0.286) (0.133) (0.288) 
         
-0.062 1.230*** 0.033 1.211*** -0.015 1.372*** -0.007 1.372*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.277) (0.375) (0.246) (0.371) (0.272) (0.389) (0.273) (0.388) 
         
0.324*** 0.287*** 0.282*** 0.246*** 0.319*** 0.283*** 0.314*** 0.291*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.050) (0.068) (0.050) (0.076) (0.049) (0.069) (0.049) (0.070) 
         
-0.052 -0.305*** 0.248** 0.011 -0.055 -0.317*** -0.054 -0.317*** GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.058) (0.095) (0.111) (0.162) (0.059) (0.098) (0.059) (0.098) 
         
-0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.007 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) 
         
Oil -0.064 0.760*** -0.202 0.596** -0.055 0.841*** -0.051 0.834*** 
 (0.171) (0.282) (0.188) (0.301) (0.165) (0.287) (0.165) (0.288) 
         
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.679***  -0.644***  -0.663***  -0.664***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.102)  (0.097)  (0.101)  (0.101)  
         
 0.389**  0.411**  0.372**  0.372** Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.174)  (0.177)  (0.179)  (0.179) 
         
Constant -5.662*** -7.734*** -6.358*** -8.370*** -5.356*** -7.792*** -5.282*** -7.917*** 
 (0.941) (1.584) (1.027) (1.622) (0.980) (1.600) (0.966) (1.616) 
N 4324 4107 4324 4107 4131 3911 4131 3911 
ll -1547.277 -538.702 -1532.004 -534.395 -1467.702 -510.838 -1468.191 -510.692 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.9 Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Political Globalization Level, Process, and 
Shock 1970-2007, All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war Riots Civil war 
  -0.002 -0.009     Political 
glob, levela   (0.006) (0.007)     
         
    -0.009** -0.006   Political 
glob, changea     (0.004) (0.005)   
         
      -0.359* -0.022 Political 
glob, shocka       (0.190) (0.244) 
         
Democracya 0.090 0.234 0.098 0.250 0.099 0.317 0.101 0.325 
 (0.165) (0.295) (0.166) (0.289) (0.165) (0.299) (0.165) (0.300) 
         
Autocracya -0.154 -0.210 -0.158 -0.256 -0.123 -0.111 -0.128 -0.112 
 (0.131) (0.288) (0.133) (0.289) (0.134) (0.287) (0.134) (0.286) 
         
-0.062 1.230*** -0.052 1.277*** -0.007 1.372*** -0.003 1.371*** Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.277) (0.375) (0.276) (0.375) (0.275) (0.388) (0.276) (0.391) 
         
0.324*** 0.287*** 0.338*** 0.346*** 0.308*** 0.284*** 0.311*** 0.287*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.050) (0.068) (0.059) (0.082) (0.048) (0.071) (0.048) (0.071) 
         
-0.052 -0.305*** -0.035 -0.257** -0.064 -0.320*** -0.062 -0.317*** GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.058) (0.095) (0.077) (0.106) (0.059) (0.097) (0.059) (0.098) 
         
-0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.006 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) 
         
Oil -0.064 0.760*** -0.064 0.755*** -0.046 0.842*** -0.040 0.837*** 
 (0.171) (0.282) (0.173) (0.273) (0.163) (0.289) (0.163) (0.290) 
         
0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-0.679***  -0.676***  -0.652***  -0.657***  Riot peace 
yrs (0.102)  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.101)  
         
 0.389**  0.380**  0.384**  0.374** Civil war 
peace yrs  (0.174)  (0.175)  (0.182)  (0.180) 
         
Constant -5.662*** -7.734*** -5.653*** -8.623*** -5.050*** -7.752*** -5.142*** -7.855*** 
 (0.941) (1.584) (1.089) (1.721) (0.964) (1.633) (0.964) (1.623) 
N 4324 4107 4324 4107 4131 3911 4131 3911 
ll -1547.277 -538.702 -1547.006 -537.760 -1465.374 -510.410 -1466.031 -510.892 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Appendix D. Alternative Types of Internal Conflict: Revolutions and 
Guerrilla Warfare 
Variable Descriptions 
Revolutions 
Like the riot event data, the data on revolutions is collected from Banks (2011). It measures 
‘[a]ny illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or 
any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government’. As with Riots, Banks’ definition is based on Rummel and Tanter (1974). 
Revolutions in their definition may be coup d’etats, or ‘attempted takeovers on a grand scale 
involving pitched battles between opposing forces’ (ibid.: 17). Note that the variable includes 
attempts at revolution, not only successful ones. It is originally coded according to number of 
revolutions or attempts, but like Riots I have coded it into a dichotomous variable. 
 
Guerrilla Warfare 
Banks (2011) also provides data on guerrilla warfare, measured in number of violent episodes 
associated with guerrilla groups. Again, I have coded a dichotomous version of the variable, 0 
representing no events in a year and 1 representing one or more. Guerrilla warfare is defined 
in the Banks User’s Manual as ‘[a]ny armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present 
regime.’ Both Revolutions and Guerrilla warfare are described as armed activity aimed at the 
overthrow of the government, but Revolutions are direct attempts at government change (like 
coup d’etats), while Guerrilla warfare denotes more indirect attacks. Rummel and Tanter 
(1974: 6-7) describe it in this way: ‘[guerrilla warfare] may take the form of sporadic attacks 
on police posts, small villages, government patrols, or military barracks. A country is also 
considered to have guerrilla war when sporadic bombing, sabotage, or terrorism occurs.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  86 
Logit Regression 
Table A.10 Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Overall Globalization Level, 
Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
  -0.016* -0.012     Overall glob, 
levela   (0.010) (0.011)     
         
    -0.003 0.000   Overall glob, 
changea     (0.009) (0.011)   
         
      -0.215 -0.091 Overall glob, 
shocka       (0.207) (0.250) 
         
Democracya -0.083 0.248 -0.053 0.256 -0.044 0.278 -0.047 0.276 
 (0.198) (0.211) (0.201) (0.212) (0.203) (0.220) (0.204) (0.220) 
         
Autocracya -0.281* -0.242 -0.299* -0.270 -0.249 -0.229 -0.247 -0.229 
 (0.166) (0.207) (0.163) (0.205) (0.170) (0.215) (0.170) (0.214) 
         
0.489* 0.379 0.547* 0.411 0.531* 0.418 0.532* 0.420 Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.284) (0.364) (0.289) (0.368) (0.289) (0.394) (0.287) (0.389) 
         
0.156*** 0.191*** 0.158*** 0.191*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.167*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.048) (0.052) (0.047) (0.052) (0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) 
         
-0.118* 0.049 0.002 0.137 -0.107 0.030 -0.108 0.029 GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.071) (0.074) (0.088) (0.108) (0.074) (0.077) (0.073) (0.077) 
         
-0.017** 0.004 -0.016** 0.006 -0.016** 0.004 -0.016** 0.004 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
         
Oil -0.147 -0.248 -0.178 -0.295 -0.185 -0.280 -0.186 -0.279 
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.185) (0.200) (0.186) (0.207) (0.186) (0.207) 
         
0.007*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.007* 0.007*** 0.007* Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-1.239***  -1.234***  -1.255***  -1.255***  Revolution 
peace yrs (0.125)  (0.126)  (0.132)  (0.131)  
         
 -1.125***  -1.127***  -1.081***  -1.081*** Guerrilla war 
peace yrs  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
         
Constant -2.962*** -3.945*** -2.968*** -4.202*** -2.111* -3.164** -2.101* -3.165** 
 (1.098) (1.112) (1.150) (1.138) (1.201) (1.238) (1.199) (1.235) 
N 3610 3611 3605 3606 3447 3448 3447 3448 
ll -1209.465 -813.129 -1204.328 -807.624 -1148.647 -744.310 -1148.196 -744.264 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.11 Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Economic Globalization Level, 
Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
  -0.007 -0.004     Economic 
glob, levela   (0.006) (0.008)     
         
    -0.002 0.005   Economic 
glob, changea     (0.005) (0.005)   
         
      -0.037 0.542** Economic 
glob, shocka       (0.225) (0.256) 
         
Democracya -0.083 0.248 -0.074 0.285 -0.052 0.307 -0.053 0.313 
 (0.198) (0.211) (0.202) (0.209) (0.207) (0.219) (0.207) (0.221) 
         
Autocracya -0.281* -0.242 -0.329** -0.432** -0.300* -0.434** -0.301* -0.432** 
 (0.166) (0.207) (0.166) (0.194) (0.177) (0.208) (0.177) (0.209) 
         
0.489* 0.379 0.470* 0.275 0.434 0.239 0.436 0.279 Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.284) (0.364) (0.286) (0.383) (0.297) (0.410) (0.296) (0.410) 
         
0.156*** 0.191*** 0.126** 0.194*** 0.156*** 0.181*** 0.156*** 0.181*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.060) (0.050) (0.058) (0.050) (0.058) 
         
-0.118* 0.049 -0.052 0.060 -0.104 0.002 -0.104 0.017 GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.071) (0.074) (0.082) (0.102) (0.077) (0.083) (0.078) (0.085) 
         
-0.017** 0.004 -0.013 0.006 -0.013 0.005 -0.013 0.005 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
         
Oil -0.147 -0.248 -0.079 -0.169 -0.092 -0.146 -0.092 -0.145 
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.184) (0.216) (0.190) (0.227) (0.190) (0.230) 
         
0.007*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.006 Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-1.239***  -1.232***  -1.258***  -1.258***  Revolution 
peace yrs (0.125)  (0.133)  (0.138)  (0.138)  
         
 -1.125***  -1.104***  -1.062***  -1.060*** Guerrilla war 
peace yrs  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.094)  (0.095) 
         
Constant -2.962*** -3.945*** -2.645** -3.779*** -1.906 -3.493*** -1.900 -3.624*** 
 (1.098) (1.112) (1.177) (1.179) (1.256) (1.278) (1.252) (1.289) 
N 3610 3611 3298 3299 3150 3151 3150 3151 
ll -1209.465 -813.129 -1106.175 -724.753 -1051.985 -663.902 -1052.080 -662.139 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.12 Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Social Globalization Level, 
Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
  -0.014 -0.018*     Social glob, 
levela   (0.009) (0.011)     
         
    -0.009 -0.008   Social glob, 
changea     (0.006) (0.009)   
         
      -0.029 0.142 Social glob, 
shocka       (0.221) (0.260) 
         
Democracya -0.083 0.248 -0.059 0.253 -0.061 0.261 -0.044 0.278 
 (0.198) (0.211) (0.201) (0.216) (0.204) (0.218) (0.203) (0.218) 
         
Autocracya -0.281* -0.242 -0.288* -0.285 -0.245 -0.222 -0.237 -0.210 
 (0.166) (0.207) (0.165) (0.205) (0.169) (0.213) (0.170) (0.213) 
         
0.489* 0.379 0.457 0.305 0.509* 0.405 0.522* 0.400 Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.284) (0.364) (0.285) (0.370) (0.285) (0.388) (0.287) (0.390) 
         
0.156*** 0.191*** 0.133*** 0.153** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.166*** 0.166*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.061) (0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) 
         
-0.118* 0.049 -0.007 0.186* -0.103 0.034 -0.106 0.028 GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.071) (0.074) (0.089) (0.107) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.077) 
         
-0.017** 0.004 -0.018** 0.002 -0.016** 0.003 -0.017** 0.002 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
         
Oil -0.147 -0.248 -0.185 -0.296 -0.176 -0.248 -0.166 -0.251 
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.181) (0.205) (0.186) (0.206) (0.184) (0.204) 
         
0.007*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.007** 0.006* 0.007** 0.006* Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-1.239***  -1.238***  -1.250***  -1.256***  Revolution 
peace yrs (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.131)  (0.130)  
         
 -1.125***  -1.118***  -1.076***  -1.082*** Guerrilla war 
peace yrs  (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.091) 
         
Constant -2.962*** -3.945*** -2.960*** -3.725*** -2.321* -3.363*** -2.136* -3.634*** 
 (1.098) (1.112) (1.098) (1.156) (1.208) (1.258) (1.201) (1.244) 
N 3610 3611 3610 3611 3452 3453 3452 3453 
ll -1209.465 -813.129 -1207.604 -811.116 -1150.895 -748.583 -1152.090 -749.060 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Table A.13 Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Political Globalization Level, 
Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
Revolu-
tions 
Guerrilla 
warfare 
  -0.001 0.006     Political 
glob, levela   (0.005) (0.006)     
         
    -0.001 -0.005   Political 
glob, changea     (0.003) (0.005)   
         
      -0.002 -0.258 Political 
glob, shocka       (0.172) (0.211) 
         
Democracya -0.083 0.248 -0.082 0.245 -0.044 0.262 -0.043 0.259 
 (0.198) (0.211) (0.198) (0.212) (0.203) (0.219) (0.203) (0.220) 
         
Autocracya -0.281* -0.242 -0.284* -0.240 -0.237 -0.223 -0.237 -0.227 
 (0.166) (0.207) (0.165) (0.208) (0.169) (0.213) (0.170) (0.211) 
         
0.489* 0.379 0.496* 0.392 0.523* 0.406 0.523* 0.410 Ethnic 
fractionaliz.a (0.284) (0.364) (0.289) (0.354) (0.287) (0.383) (0.288) (0.386) 
         
0.156*** 0.191*** 0.164*** 0.151** 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 0.165*** Population, 
total (ln)a (0.048) (0.052) (0.057) (0.073) (0.049) (0.056) (0.049) (0.056) 
         
-0.118* 0.049 -0.111 0.012 -0.107 0.022 -0.106 0.026 GDP p.c. 
(ln)a (0.071) (0.074) (0.076) (0.081) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.076) 
         
-0.017** 0.004 -0.017** 0.003 -0.017** -0.000 -0.017** 0.001 GDP growth 
(%)a (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
         
Oil -0.147 -0.248 -0.147 -0.245 -0.166 -0.228 -0.166 -0.234 
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.181) (0.194) (0.184) (0.204) (0.185) (0.203) 
         
0.007*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.006* 0.007** 0.006* Mountainous 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
-1.239***  -1.238***  -1.254***  -1.256***  Revolution 
peace yrs (0.125)  (0.126)  (0.131)  (0.131)  
         
 -1.125***  -1.120***  -1.075***  -1.075*** Guerrilla war 
peace yrs  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.091)  (0.091) 
         
Constant -2.962*** -3.945*** -3.089** -3.052** -2.103* -3.467*** -2.128* -3.074** 
 (1.098) (1.112) (1.217) (1.450) (1.213) (1.261) (1.214) (1.239) 
N 3610 3611 3610 3611 3452 3453 3452 3453 
ll -1209.465 -813.129 -1209.417 -812.526 -1152.056 -748.385 -1152.101 -748.580 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time dummies and splines not shown 
aLagged one year 
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Appendix E. Correlation Matrices 
Table A.14 Correlation Matrix, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded, 1970-2007 (obs=2884) 
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Riots 1
Revolutions 0,09 1
Guerrilla warfare 0,11 0,42 1
Civil war onset 0,07 0,13 0,13 1
Overall glob. level -0,06 -0,12 -0,11 -0,07 1
Economic glob. level -0,10 -0,11 -0,12 -0,08 0,88 1
Social glob. level -0,12 -0,13 -0,12 -0,09 0,91 0,79 1
Political glob. level 0,10 -0,03 -0,01 0,04 0,55 0,19 0,28 1
Overall glob. change 0,01 -0,02 -0,03 0,02 0,06 0,02 0,03 0,12 1
Economic glob. change 0,04 0,04 -0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 -0,01 0,07 0,51 1
Social glob. change 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,08 0,15 0,46 0,04 1
Political glob. change -0,04 -0,02 -0,05 0,03 -0,01 0,03 0,01 -0,08 0,62 0,00 0,04 1
Overall glob. shock 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,03 0,06 0,66 0,26 0,33 0,47 1
Economic glob. shock 0,04 0,04 -0,04 0,02 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 0,06 0,37 0,63 0,02 0,01 0,17 1
Social glob. shock -0,01 0,02 -0,01 0,05 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,08 0,35 0,03 0,79 0,02 0,25 0,01 1
Political glob. shock -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 0,02 -0,02 0,01 -0,01 -0,07 0,53 0,01 0,04 0,77 0,47 0,02 0,02 1
Actual flows -0,09 -0,11 -0,14 -0,08 0,74 0,89 0,64 0,14 -0,04 0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,04 -0,02 1
Restrictions -0,08 -0,09 -0,07 -0,06 0,81 0,87 0,77 0,20 0,07 0,02 0,10 0,08 0,00 -0,04 0,05 0,04 0,55 1
Personal contacts -0,13 -0,20 -0,15 -0,10 0,65 0,69 0,79 -0,05 -0,06 -0,07 -0,06 0,06 -0,06 -0,11 -0,04 0,03 0,61 0,60 1
Information flows -0,12 -0,12 -0,12 -0,09 0,87 0,73 0,91 0,36 0,03 0,02 0,07 -0,01 -0,03 -0,02 0,02 -0,04 0,57 0,72 0,62 1
Cultural proximity -0,07 -0,03 -0,05 -0,04 0,77 0,60 0,82 0,36 0,08 0,01 0,18 0,00 0,01 -0,04 0,11 -0,01 0,45 0,62 0,43 0,65 1
Democracy 0,07 -0,02 0,07 0,00 0,38 0,29 0,36 0,24 0,04 0,05 0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 -0,02 0,20 0,32 0,19 0,38 0,32 1
Autocracy -0,03 0,03 -0,06 0,00 -0,44 -0,34 -0,40 -0,29 -0,11 -0,06 -0,14 -0,03 -0,06 -0,05 -0,09 -0,05 -0,25 -0,36 -0,23 -0,39 -0,38 -0,59 1
Ethn. fractionalization 0,00 0,09 0,06 0,09 -0,25 -0,14 -0,33 -0,10 0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,06 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,07 -0,05 -0,22 -0,24 -0,34 -0,22 -0,18 0,05 1
Population (log) 0,26 0,14 0,19 0,14 -0,11 -0,31 -0,29 0,50 0,09 0,07 0,17 -0,08 0,05 0,06 0,10 -0,04 -0,38 -0,16 -0,58 -0,21 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,08 1
GDP per capita (log) 0,01 -0,13 -0,01 -0,06 0,73 0,63 0,76 0,30 -0,08 -0,06 0,00 -0,07 -0,08 -0,13 -0,02 -0,07 0,50 0,62 0,69 0,69 0,52 0,36 -0,31 -0,41 -0,17 1
GDP growth (%) -0,09 -0,10 0,01 -0,02 0,10 0,11 0,07 0,06 -0,01 -0,03 0,03 -0,10 -0,04 -0,06 0,02 -0,09 0,07 0,11 0,05 0,08 0,03 -0,04 0,00 -0,03 0,06 0,08 1
Oil 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,04 -0,04 -0,01 -0,01 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,04 -0,02 0,02 0,07 -0,09 -0,13 0,17 0,00 0,09 0,18 0,04 1
Mountainous 0,06 0,12 0,13 0,03 -0,13 -0,17 -0,13 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,22 -0,06 -0,25 -0,07 -0,04 0,00 0,04 -0,17 0,19 -0,12 0,00 -0,04 1
Riot peace years -0,23 -0,07 -0,12 -0,05 0,18 0,23 0,23 -0,08 -0,05 -0,01 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 -0,05 0,18 0,22 0,24 0,19 0,17 -0,07 0,02 0,06 -0,29 0,09 0,06 0,03 -0,17 1
Riot cubic spline 1 0,16 0,06 0,11 0,03 -0,18 -0,22 -0,22 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,04 -0,16 -0,22 -0,21 -0,17 -0,18 0,06 0,01 -0,07 0,22 -0,11 -0,06 -0,05 0,17 -0,95 1
Riot cubic spline 2 0,14 0,06 0,10 0,02 -0,18 -0,21 -0,21 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 -0,02 0,03 -0,15 -0,22 -0,21 -0,17 -0,18 0,06 0,02 -0,07 0,20 -0,11 -0,06 -0,06 0,17 -0,93 1,00 1
Riot cubic spline 3 0,12 0,05 0,10 0,02 -0,18 -0,21 -0,21 0,03 0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,03 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,02 -0,14 -0,22 -0,20 -0,17 -0,18 0,06 0,03 -0,07 0,18 -0,11 -0,06 -0,07 0,17 -0,89 0,99 0,99 1
Revolutiion peace yrs -0,06 -0,30 -0,25 -0,06 0,39 0,32 0,39 0,20 -0,06 -0,02 -0,04 -0,07 -0,05 -0,01 -0,03 -0,05 0,27 0,30 0,37 0,35 0,28 0,11 -0,18 -0,17 -0,18 0,34 0,03 -0,03 -0,22 0,29 -0,29 -0,28 -0,27 1
Revolution spline 1 0,07 0,21 0,19 0,06 -0,39 -0,31 -0,39 -0,20 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,03 0,04 -0,25 -0,31 -0,34 -0,35 -0,30 -0,12 0,20 0,16 0,15 -0,32 -0,02 0,04 0,20 -0,28 0,30 0,30 0,29 -0,95 1
Revolution spline 2 0,07 0,19 0,17 0,05 -0,38 -0,31 -0,38 -0,20 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,02 0,04 -0,24 -0,31 -0,33 -0,34 -0,30 -0,12 0,20 0,16 0,14 -0,31 -0,02 0,04 0,20 -0,27 0,29 0,30 0,29 -0,93 1,00 1
Revolution spline 3 0,07 0,17 0,16 0,05 -0,37 -0,30 -0,37 -0,19 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,04 -0,01 0,02 0,03 -0,22 -0,31 -0,31 -0,34 -0,31 -0,12 0,20 0,15 0,13 -0,30 -0,02 0,04 0,18 -0,26 0,29 0,29 0,29 -0,89 0,98 0,99 1
Guerrilla peace yrs -0,08 -0,26 -0,37 -0,07 0,30 0,23 0,24 0,24 -0,01 0,02 0,02 -0,07 0,01 0,06 0,01 -0,05 0,24 0,16 0,14 0,27 0,20 0,02 -0,13 -0,01 -0,16 0,08 0,00 -0,05 -0,27 0,28 -0,29 -0,29 -0,29 0,53 -0,51 -0,50 -0,48 1
Guerrilla spline 1 0,07 0,19 0,27 0,05 -0,30 -0,22 -0,24 -0,26 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 0,06 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 0,04 -0,21 -0,18 -0,12 -0,27 -0,22 -0,05 0,17 -0,01 0,11 -0,08 -0,01 0,06 0,25 -0,25 0,28 0,29 0,29 -0,49 0,50 0,49 0,49 -0,97 1
Guerrilla spline 2 0,07 0,18 0,24 0,05 -0,29 -0,22 -0,24 -0,26 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 0,06 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 0,04 -0,20 -0,18 -0,11 -0,27 -0,22 -0,05 0,18 -0,01 0,10 -0,08 -0,01 0,06 0,24 -0,24 0,27 0,28 0,29 -0,47 0,49 0,49 0,48 -0,94 1,00 1
Guerrilla spline 3 0,07 0,16 0,22 0,05 -0,29 -0,21 -0,24 -0,26 -0,01 -0,02 -0,03 0,05 0,01 -0,05 -0,01 0,04 -0,19 -0,19 -0,10 -0,27 -0,22 -0,06 0,18 -0,02 0,09 -0,08 -0,02 0,06 0,23 -0,22 0,26 0,27 0,28 -0,44 0,47 0,47 0,47 -0,91 0,98 0,99 1
Civil war peace yrs -0,07 -0,29 -0,34 -0,09 0,40 0,35 0,36 0,22 -0,04 0,01 -0,01 -0,09 -0,04 0,00 -0,03 -0,09 0,35 0,26 0,26 0,37 0,29 0,10 -0,15 -0,18 -0,19 0,21 0,02 -0,06 -0,13 0,22 -0,22 -0,21 -0,20 0,64 -0,62 -0,61 -0,59 0,69 -0,65 -0,63 -0,60 1
Civil war spline 1 0,05 0,21 0,26 0,08 -0,41 -0,35 -0,37 -0,25 0,02 -0,02 0,00 0,08 0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,07 -0,32 -0,29 -0,24 -0,37 -0,32 -0,13 0,20 0,16 0,13 -0,22 -0,02 0,06 0,11 -0,21 0,22 0,22 0,22 -0,62 0,65 0,64 0,64 -0,67 0,66 0,66 0,64 -0,96 1
Civil war spline 2 0,05 0,19 0,23 0,07 -0,41 -0,34 -0,37 -0,26 0,02 -0,02 -0,01 0,07 0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,07 -0,31 -0,29 -0,23 -0,37 -0,32 -0,14 0,20 0,16 0,12 -0,22 -0,02 0,06 0,10 -0,20 0,21 0,22 0,22 -0,61 0,65 0,65 0,64 -0,65 0,66 0,66 0,65 -0,94 1,00 1
Civil war spline 3 0,05 0,17 0,21 0,07 -0,41 -0,34 -0,37 -0,26 0,01 -0,03 -0,01 0,06 0,03 -0,02 0,00 0,06 -0,30 -0,30 -0,22 -0,37 -0,33 -0,14 0,21 0,15 0,10 -0,21 -0,03 0,06 0,10 -0,18 0,20 0,21 0,21 -0,58 0,64 0,64 0,65 -0,62 0,65 0,65 0,65 -0,90 0,98 0,99 1
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Table A.15 Correlation Matrix, All Countries, 1970-2007 (obs=3931) 
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Riots 1
Civil war onset 0,07 1
Overall glob. level -0,09 -0,09 1
Economic glob. level -0,12 -0,09 0,90 1
Social glob. level -0,13 -0,10 0,95 0,83 1
Political glob. level 0,04 -0,01 0,71 0,40 0,54 1
Overall glob. change 0,02 0,01 -0,05 -0,07 -0,07 0,04 1
Economic glob. change 0,05 0,00 -0,02 -0,02 -0,05 0,02 0,50 1
Social glob. change 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,03 0,10 0,46 0,05 1
Political glob. change -0,03 0,02 -0,10 -0,06 -0,09 -0,13 0,62 0,00 0,04 1
Overall glob. shock 0,01 0,02 -0,08 -0,08 -0,09 -0,01 0,66 0,25 0,32 0,49 1
Economic glob. shock 0,04 0,03 -0,11 -0,12 -0,13 -0,03 0,36 0,64 0,04 0,01 0,17 1
Social glob. shock -0,01 0,03 0,01 -0,02 0,00 0,05 0,34 0,03 0,79 0,01 0,22 0,02 1
Political glob. shock -0,01 0,02 -0,11 -0,07 -0,10 -0,12 0,54 0,01 0,05 0,74 0,49 0,02 0,02 1
Democracy 0,04 -0,04 0,55 0,45 0,52 0,46 -0,02 0,02 0,03 -0,08 -0,04 -0,05 0,00 -0,08 1
Autocracy -0,03 0,01 -0,49 -0,40 -0,46 -0,41 -0,05 -0,04 -0,13 0,04 -0,01 -0,01 -0,08 0,01 -0,62 1
Ethn. fractionalization 0,01 0,11 -0,34 -0,26 -0,38 -0,22 0,04 0,01 -0,01 0,09 0,08 0,06 0,01 0,10 -0,30 0,16 1
Population (log) 0,25 0,12 0,01 -0,20 -0,11 0,46 0,08 0,07 0,16 -0,10 0,03 0,04 0,08 -0,06 0,10 -0,08 0,02 1
GDP per capita (log) -0,04 -0,09 0,83 0,72 0,84 0,54 -0,15 -0,09 -0,03 -0,14 -0,13 -0,18 -0,03 -0,13 0,54 -0,41 -0,48 -0,02 1
GDP growth (%) -0,08 -0,03 0,01 0,05 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 0,03 -0,08 -0,03 -0,05 0,02 -0,07 -0,08 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00 1
Oil -0,01 0,05 -0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,06 -0,04 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,02 -0,18 0,18 0,03 -0,03 0,10 0,05 1
Mountainous 0,06 0,03 -0,13 -0,18 -0,12 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,03 -0,08 0,19 -0,13 0,00 -0,06 1
Riot peace years -0,24 -0,06 0,24 0,29 0,27 0,02 -0,07 -0,03 -0,03 -0,06 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,31 0,15 0,05 0,05 -0,14 1
Riot cubic spline 1 0,17 0,04 -0,24 -0,29 -0,26 -0,04 0,06 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,05 -0,01 0,05 0,02 0,25 -0,16 -0,05 -0,07 0,14 -0,96 1
Riot cubic spline 2 0,15 0,04 -0,24 -0,28 -0,26 -0,05 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,04 -0,01 0,05 0,02 0,23 -0,16 -0,05 -0,07 0,13 -0,94 1,00 1
Riot cubic spline 3 0,14 0,03 -0,24 -0,28 -0,25 -0,05 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,04 -0,02 0,06 0,02 0,21 -0,16 -0,05 -0,07 0,13 -0,90 0,99 1,00 1
Civil war peace yrs -0,11 -0,09 0,46 0,43 0,44 0,30 -0,07 -0,02 -0,03 -0,10 -0,07 -0,04 -0,04 -0,10 0,19 -0,20 -0,22 -0,16 0,32 -0,01 -0,05 -0,10 0,36 -0,36 -0,35 -0,35 1
Civil war spline 1 0,10 0,08 -0,47 -0,43 -0,44 -0,32 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,09 0,06 0,03 0,03 0,09 -0,21 0,23 0,20 0,11 -0,32 0,01 0,05 0,08 -0,35 0,37 0,37 0,37 -0,97 1
Civil war spline 2 0,09 0,07 -0,47 -0,43 -0,44 -0,32 0,06 0,01 0,02 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,08 -0,21 0,23 0,19 0,10 -0,31 0,00 0,05 0,07 -0,35 0,37 0,37 0,37 -0,95 1,00 1
Civil war spline 3 0,08 0,07 -0,46 -0,42 -0,43 -0,32 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,07 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,08 -0,21 0,23 0,19 0,08 -0,30 0,00 0,05 0,07 -0,33 0,37 0,37 0,37 -0,91 0,98 0,99 1
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Appendix F. VIF values 
Logit regression run on dependent variable civil war onset (onset2). STATA commands: 
 
logit onset2 l.oglob l.demo l.auto l.iethfrac l.lpop l.lgdppc l.gdpg oil mtnesti yeardum1-yeardum38 if 
oecd ==0, cl(cow) 
 
vif, uncentered 
 
Table A.16 VIF values 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
GDP p.c. (ln) (lagged) 94.19 0.010616  
Population (ln) (lagged) 48.97 0.020422  
Overall glob. level (lagged) 42.94 0.023290  
Ethn. fractionaliz. (lagged) 4.19 0.238799  
Autocracy (lagged) 2.93 0.340973  
Democracy (lagged) 2.40 0.417076  
yeardum24 1.93 0.518308  
yeardum23 1.92 0.519691  
yeardum25 1.92 0.521596  
yeardum26 1.91 0.524888  
yeardum27 1.89 0.530318  
yeardum28 1.88 0.530907  
yeardum29 1.88 0.531953  
yeardum37 1.86 0.538092  
yeardum30 1.86 0.538214  
yeardum34 1.86 0.538395  
yeardum35 1.85 0.539442  
yeardum33 1.85 0.539785  
yeardum36 1.85 0.540977  
yeardum32 1.84 0.543326  
yeardum31 1.84 0.544796  
yeardum20 1.83 0.546149  
yeardum22 1.82 0.549729  
yeardum21 1.81 0.551452  
yeardum14 1.81 0.552560  
yeardum15 1.81 0.552917  
yeardum18 1.81 0.553944  
yeardum17 1.78 0.560863  
Mountainous terrain 1.78 0.562909  
yeardum8 1.76 0.566952  
yeardum13 1.76 0.568664  
yeardum7 1.74 0.576340  
yeardum6 1.72 0.580184  
yeardum10 1.72 0.580908  
yeardum4 1.71 0.584466  
yeardum5 1.71 0.584664  
yeardum12 1.70 0.587063  
yeardum3 1.70 0.588076  
yeardum11 1.69 0.590507  
yeardum2 1.67 0.597834  
GDP growth (lagged) 1.50 0.664893  
Oil 1.47 0.681757  
Mean VIF 6.19   !
